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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1990s, China’s has low-cost workforce and price advantage of low-end
products gave rise to a rapid increase in exporting trade and GDP. The global labor
market channels a large share of the workforce to developing countries, like China
and Viet Nam, which has a negative effect on the labor market in developed countries,
like the United States. Over the last ten years, China’s impressive economic growth
has begun to slow. Labor-intensive industries have started to relocate from coastal
areas to inland areas and even to other low-cost developing countries in search of
cheaper workers. Also, due to the decline of purchase orders, factories, mines, and
construction projects are closing down. With these changing conditions, employees’
rights are threatened with wages decreases, unpaid wages, and loss of compensation.
According to data from the NGO (China Labor Bulletin), the number of strikes and
labor protests reported in 2014 more than doubled to 1,378.1 In these strikes and labor
protests, factory workers, taxi drivers, and teachers across the country demanded
better treatment.2 Employees’ self-organized and initiated strikes and protests have
become the main economic weapon used by workers.3 According to surveys on
workers movements from 2011-2012, labor conflicts mostly occurred in
manufacturing industries in the coastal areas of China, especially in the Guandong
province.4 Motivating the increased labor strife are the workers’ demands, which fall

1

Alexandra Harney, China Labor Activists Say Facing Unprecedented Intimidation, REUTERS (Jan. 21,
2015 12:47PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/21/us-china-labouridUSKBN0KU13V20150121?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews
2
Labor unrest: Out Brothers, Out!, ECONOMIST, Jan. 31, 2015, available at
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21641275-guangdong-province-pioneers-new-approachkeeping-workers-happy-out-brothers-out.
3
Zhongguo Gongren Yundong Guancha Baogao (2011-2012) (中国工人运动观察报告 (2011-2012)),
CHINA LAB. BULL., 2 (June 18, 2013), http://www.clb.org.hk/schi/sites/default/files/2011-2012 工人运
动报告.pdf.
4
Id. at 3-4.

1

into three categories: asking for compensation due to factory closure, relocation, and
transfer; asking for increased wages and unpaid wages; and asking for benefits from
SOEs reform.5 The results of these demands are different: one-third of these demands
did not have reported outcomes while 80 percent of the other demands had been
resolved.6 Although the workers’ protests could entirely or partially satisfy workers’
demands in the end, some workers, especially the strike leaders, are routinely fired,
and sometimes detained by police and charged with the crime of “disturbing the
public order.” 7 Realizing workers’ demands cannot be ensured without greater
protection in both law and policy. Moreover, the employer has begun to utilize
strategies to lower business costs: cutting down on positions but increasing tasks per
employee; decreasing tasks for workers inducing them to resign their positions;
relocating the plant to low-cost areas; and using labor dispatch workers not in
provisional, auxiliary or substitutive positions.8 These strategies prevent employees
from obtaining fair compensation, benefits, and payment.
In order to satisfy workers’ demands and create stronger policy for the PRC,
drawing from the U.S.’s collective bargaining system, labor law, and case law
precedents, I will make a comparative analysis of the protections for workers in labor
laws and alternative dispute resolutions (arbitrations) in China and the United States.

5

Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 22.
7
Aaron Halegua, China's New Collective Bargaining Rule Is Too Weak To Ease Labour Conflicts, S.
CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 25, 2015 5:45PM), http://www.scmp.com/comment/insightopinion/article/1723213/chinas-new-collective-bargaining-rule-too-weak-ease-labour
8
Zhongguo Gongren Yundong Guancha Baogao (2011-2012), supra note 3, at 12; Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Laodong Hetong Fa (中华人民共和国劳动合同法) [Labor Contract Law of the People’s
Republic of China (2012 Amendment)] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Dec. 28, 2012, effective Dec. 28, 2012) (Lawinfochina) (China), Art. 66. Art.66: “Labor dispatch is a
supplementary form and shall exclusively apply to provisional, auxiliary or substitutive positions.
‘Provisional position' as prescribed in the preceding paragraph means a position that exists for less than
six months; ‘auxiliary position' means a non-major business position providing services to main
business positions; and ‘substitutive position' means a position that may be held by any other employee
on a substitutive basis during a certain period of time when the employee of the employer who
originally holds the position is unable to work because such employee is undergoing full-time training,
on vacation or for any other reason”.
6
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Comparative analyses of labor laws and industrial relations can be a useful for labor
law reforms in China for a variety of reasons.9 First, learning about other countries
can help identify successful labor laws in those countries, and the manner in which
the laws and institutions developed.10 Second, comparative studies are worthwhile in
discovering commonalities among the surveyed countries to figure out any general
structures between different societies and cultures, realizing that the national
industrialization systems are becoming more uniform and varied in different ways
under globalization.11 Third, comparative studies are useful to provide a particular
country with recommendations for labor law reform in order to improve the
performance of the industrial relations system.12 As for China, learning how the
system in the United States operates could motivate and provide ideas to China in
reviewing their current system with respect to efficiency and equity.
In Part II of my thesis, I review the labor market in China and the United
States and emphasize the significance of collective bargaining. As for China,
collective bargaining (negotiation) between the union representing employees and the
employer is necessary because in most cases employers are not willing to negotiate
with their employees and strikes are costly and problematic for officials obsessed with
maintaining harmonization and social stability.13 From an economic perspective, I
then analyze the challenges of an imperfect labor market by discussing unequal
bargaining power, unemployment, and the externalities and social costs of labor. With
respect to the costs and benefits in the existing imperfect labor market, union
attendance and regulations are important to maintain fair conditions of employment.
9

Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Labor Law and Industrial Peace: A Comparative Analysis of the United
States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan under the Bargaining Model, 8 TUL. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 117, 118 (2000).
10
Id. at 119.
11
Id. at 118.
12
Id. at 118-19.
13
Halegua, supra note 7.
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In order to satisfy workers’ demands, discussing the protections in labor laws and
alternative dispute resolutions in both countries is especially significant for China in
reviewing its own protections.
In the following chapters, I conduct a comparative analysis of the labor laws
and arbitration regulations in China and the United States by discussing the definition
of employees, workers’ organizing rights, remedies for employees, and the challenges
of China’s arbitration system. In Part III, I make a comparative analysis of labor laws
in China and the United States by means of discussing the definition of employees,
the basic right of employees to participate in union’s activities, and remedies for
improper behavior of employers. In Part IV, after a brief review of the arbitration
laws in both countries, I discuss the current challenges in China referring to the U.S.
arbitration models.

II. A REVIEW OF THE LABOR MARKET – THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

A. THE LABOR MARKET AND THE WORKERS’ DEMANDS OF THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES
The initial labor system was set up by the PRC in the 1950s was adopted from
the Soviet Model and based on a centrally planned economy, including labor and the
administration of wages.14 At that time, the PRC employed a “price-scissors” policy
based on the Soviet Model in order to accumulate capital and ensure profits for
enterprises. Under this policy, the government maintained low agricultural prices
and low rural and urban wages while maintaining high prices for manufactured goods

14

JOHN B. KNIGHT & LINA SONG, TOWARDS A LABOR MARKET IN CHINA 13 (Oxford: Oxford Univ.
Press 2005).
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permitting for the centrally planned re-investment of profits into state-owned
enterprises (SOEs).15 In this way, not only did rural peasants effectively pay for
industrialization at the expense of their own interests, but urban workers’ rights
were also undermined by the policy.16 Under these conditions, the Chinese labor
market system was an administrated labor system rather than a labor market.17
In 1978, Deng Xiaoping proposed a remarkable process of economic reform in
China. Under the direction of reformers, China changed from a “Central Planned
Economy” to a “Market Economy”. During the process of economic reform, the
labor market shifted away from an administrated labor system. The transition
focused first on increasing economic activity in specific areas with the
expectation that the prosperity in one area would assist and spread to other
sectors – prosperity to some, then to most, then to all.18 The labor reforms began at
this time by means of abandoning the system of labor allocation, requiring or
permitting real wages to rise, and introducing “performance-related wage
incentives/distribution wages according to performance (an lao fen pei).”19
At the same time, the workforce transferred from rural to urban areas. In the
mid-1980s this migration was of particular importance due to the rapid growth of the
urban economy and the slow growth of the urban-born workforce under the one-child
policy.20 In the 1990s, the growth of the urban labor force was faster, 3.6 per cent per
annum, than the growth of the rural labor force, 0.2 percent, resulting in continued

15

Id. at 18.
Jiandao Cha De Jingji Xue: Guanyu Zhongguo De Shizheng Yanjiu (剪刀差的经济学：关于中国
的实证研) [Economics of the Price Scissors: Empirical Studies] Zhongguo Jingji Jiaoyu Keyan Wang
(中国经济教育科研网) [CHINA ECON. RES. INTERNET] (Apr. 7, 2008),
http://economics.cenet.org.cn/show-2204-33649-1.html.
17
KNIGHT & SONG, supra note 14, at 17.
18
Xiaoping Deng proposed this concept in 1985.
19
KNIGHT & SONG, supra note 14, at 21.
20
Id. at 22.
16
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rural-to-urban migration and the reclassification of some areas as urban.21 Because of
this rural-to-urban migration, the state-owned sector absorbed 58 percent of new
urban employees in 1988; however, by 1997 the figure was down to 32 percent.22
The rural/urban labor redistribution was also required by China’s rapid
economic growth. The rapid growth of the Chinese GDP, about 10 percent per annum
between 2003 and 2012,23 exceeded the labor force growth rate of about 2.7 percent
per annum over these same years.24 According to Figure 1(1) below, Shenzhen has the
largest private sector and also the highest proportion of migrant workers in total
employment.25 Since the reforms started, China’s rapid growth has been driven by
internal labor mobility. This is confirmed by empirical studies showing that
workforce mobility and reallocation increased GDP by about 16 to 22 percent.26 By
the end of 2009, China had a total of 229.8 million rural migrant workers. Among
them, 145.3 million rural migrant workers worked outside of their hometowns for
over six months.27 In the late 1990s, in order to pose a lesser threat to society and
maintain political stability, the PRC government decided that unemployment should
be transferred to the rural areas.28 The government restricted the recruitment and reemployment of rural migrants, and unemployed urban-hukou residents were given
priority by urban job centers responding to the widespread layoffs of urban

21

Id. at 33.
Id. at 24.
23
“GDP Growth (annual%) 2005:11.31%; 2006: 12.70%; 2007: 14.20%; 2008: 9.60%; 2009: 9.21%;
2010: 10.45%; 2011: 9.30%; 2012: 7.8%.” For more information, see Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian (中国
统计年鉴) [NEW STATISTICAL YEARBOOKS], CHINA, CHINA STAT. PRESS, APP. II 2-4 (2013), available at
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2013/indexch.htm.
24
KNIGHT & SONG, supra note 14, at 31.
25
Id. at 90-1.
26
Dewen Wang, Rural-Urban Migration and Policy Responses in China: Challenges and Options,
(ILO Asian Reg’l Programme on Governance of Lab. Migration, Working Paper No.15, 2008),
available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---robangkok/documents/publication/wcms_160569.pdf.
27
Labour Migration, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/beijing/areas-of-work/labourmigration/lang--en/index.htm (last visited July 3, 2015).
28
KNIGHT & SONG, supra note 14, at 22.
22
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employees.29 Economic reform also transformed State-owned enterprises (SOEs)30
from classical SOEs to privatized SOEs.31 Due to the low profits and inefficiency of
State-owned Enterprises, a number of SOEs closed, creating a large number of lay off
employees (xiagang).32
Figure 1(1) Basic data on the four cities33

Official statistics number of
employees (Population 1994
million)
Total
Migrant
Non-migrant

Beijing

Shenzhen

Suzhou

Wuhan

2,825

557

1,230

996

561

193

213

193

2,264

363

1,016

803

Migrants as a percentage of total city employment
All

19.9

34.6

17.3

19.3

Production or supporting
worker
Skilled worker

22.7

44.7

26.4

26.9

25.5

30.3

6.7

15.2

Managerial and technician
staff

2.0

1.3

0.6

0.7

The layoffs in the state sector, starting in the mid-1990s, intensified in 1997
and continued to worsen.34 Some SOEs survived, and many of the smaller SOEs

29

Id.
An SOE is a legal entity that undertakes commercial activities on behalf of an owner government.
31
China has over 150,000 SOEs at the national and local level, ranging from well-known behemoths
like China Petro, China Mobile, and China Shipping to smaller provincial-level firms that often branch
out into odd market areas such as hotels and shopping malls. Many of these companies have serious
internal problems, including mismanagement, inefficiency, and inaccurate accounting methods. For
more information, see Shannon Tiezzi, Xi’s New Year’s Resolution: Reform China’s State-Owned
Enterprises, THE DIPLOMAT, Jan. 14, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/xis-new-years-resolutionreform-chinas-state-owned-enterprises/
32
Laid-off workers still retain their relationship with their state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and receive
a minimum subsidy for two years. The government, however, does not count them in the
unemployment statistics for those two years, nor do they count the hundreds of millions of unemployed
rural Chinese.
33 KNIGHT & SONG, supra note 14, at 90-91.
30
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declared bankruptcy during this time. Displaced workers who had joined the state
sector before 198535 were xia gang employees, but still retained their relationship
with the SOE. The SOEs established “Re-employment centers” (RECs) providing
those xia gang employees with retraining, job searching and unemployment
benefits.36 The SOEs were allowed to implement a unilateral buy-out offer, regarding
how much compensation xia gang workers received based on the length of time they
have served.
Xia gang employees, in most circumstances, only obtain one-time economic
compensation according to their length of service, and then become officially
unemployed.37 If their employers contributed to an unemployment insurance fund on
their behalf, the workers were authorized as unemployment and to receive
unemployment benefits.38 Since Re-employment Centers were phased out by 2005,
however, xia gang workers have been empowered to register as unemployed to obtain
unemployment benefits.39 All unemployed workers have incentives to find new jobs
elsewhere including the non-state sector or self-employment, although those who
have more skills or are young likely have an easier time finding a new job and gaining

34

KNIGHT & SONG, supra note 14, at 29.
Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Jingji Tizhi Gaige De Jueding (中共中央关于经济体制改革的决
定) [The Central Committee of CPC's Decision on Economic System Reform] (promulgated by the
P.R.C. the Third Plenary Session of the Twelfth Central Committee, Oct. 20, 1984, effective 1985).
36
Ray Brooks & Ran Tao, China's Labor Market Performance and Challenges 16 (Washington, D.C.:
IMF, Asia and Pacific Dept., Working Paper WP/03/210, 2003).
37
Gongren Jiti Xingdong Shiyi Nian (工人集体行动十一年：基于 553 个个案的分析) [Empirical
Studies on Collective Actions for Eleven Years], CHINA LAB. BULL., 5 (Dec. 21, 2011),
http://www.clb.org.hk/schi/sites/default/files/20002010_Chinese_workers_movement_research_report_1.pdf
38
KNIGHT & LINA SONG, supra note 14, at 29.
39
Guanyu Qieshi Zuohao Guoyou Qiye Xiagang Zhigong Jiben Shenghuo Baozhang Zhidu Binggui
Youguan Gongzuo De Tongzhi De Yaoqiu (关于切实做好国有企业下岗职工基本生活保障制度向
失业保险制度并轨有关工作的通知的要求) (promulgated by the MINISTRY OF HUM. RESOURCES &
SOC. SEC. CHINA (MOHRSS) Feb. 24, 2005, effective Feb. 24, 2005).
35

8

a better salary. Protests by displaced workers over their benefits and compensation
increased over the course of the increased layoff period.40
The surviving SOEs increased productivity at the expense of layoff workers’
rights and benefits. At the same time, workers realized that they have a right to
demand improved working conditions. By the end of 2009, China had a total of 229.8
million rural migrant workers. Among them, 145.3 million rural migrant workers
worked outside their hometowns for a period over six months.41 Due to lack of
available collective bargaining mechanisms, intensive strikes happened in the summer
of 2010. Among the striking workers, the majority were migrant workers born in the
1980s or 1990s.42
In 2001, China’s WTO participation drove it to reform its labor market with a
new perspective. As part of the new reforms, depending on the quality of their lands,
some rural workers were able to cultivate higher value-added crops, which made other
workers living on marginal land more subject to poverty and/or urban migration.43 In
particularly, rural workers in mid-western provinces lost their job because of a
skewed massive surplus of agricultural workers and less need for rural labor. Farmers,
therefore, came to leave their lands, going to urban areas, especially coastal areas, to
find a job.44
As a result of the rural-to-urban migration, job loss reached 14.5 million – 13
million workers in rural areas and 1.5 million in urban areas (for the most part in the

40

CHINA LAB. BULL., supra note 37, at 4.
Labor Migration, ILO COUNTRY OFFICE FOR CHINA, http://www.ilo.org/beijing/areas-ofwork/labour-migration/lang--en/index.htm.
42
Migrant workers in China refer to the workers who migrate within a country and are working far
away from their hometown.
43
Brooks & Tao, supra note 36, at 19.
44
Shulian Zhou & Houkai Wei (周叔莲 魏后凯), Jiaru WTO Dui Zhongguo Quyue Jingji Fazhan De
Yingxiang (加入 WTO 对中国区域经济发展的影响) [Joining in the WTO: Impacts on Chinese
Economics], THE MODERN ECONOMIC RESEARCH (现代经济讨论) 3, 4 (2002).
41

9

automobile and machinery industries).45 In the medium-term of WTO accession, by
means of restructuring, benefits in higher job growth are estimated at about 0.5-0.75
percent annually.46 A sizable portion of China's increase in world market share has
resulted in job growth where resources of labor-intensive industries shifted from less
competitive capital-intensive industries.47 In the long-term, China’s increase in world
market share induced a massive relocation of foreign manufacturing to coastal China,
drawing a large number of jobs to China in the global labor market.
Due to the low wages in China and lack of a practical means to collective
bargaining, strikes in China are on the rise.48 China’s strikes are unique in that most
strikes are economic strikes occurring at the onset of disputes with little negotiation
occurring between labor and management. This is different than in the United States
where strikes usually occur as a last resort after collective bargaining fails. However,
there is also a challenge for developed countries like the United States to confront
under the global labor market. Workers in those developed countries have limited
redress in global market, weakening their bargaining power.49 For instance, in the
United States, manufacturing workers have begun to lose their jobs to low-cost
foreign countries. American unions cannot use their bargaining power to organize
employees outside of the United States, even if they worked in a U.S-owned
enterprise in a developing country, since the NLRA only regulates domestic
business.50 Thus, on the one hand, the low-cost workforce and price advantage of
low-end products in developing countries, such as China and Viet Nam, create rapid

45

Brooks & Tao, supra note 36, at 19.
Id.
47
Id.
48
Strike Map, CHINA LAB. BULL., http://maps.clb.org.hk/strikes/en (last visited July 6, 2015).
49
Katherine S. Newman, Great Recession and the Pressure on Workplace Rights, 88 CHI.- KENT L.
REV. 529, 530-31 (2013).
50
Charles B. Craver, The Relevance of the NLRA and Labor Organizations in the Post-Industrial
Global Economy, 57 LAB. L.J. 133, 136-37 (2006).
46
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developments in those country’s exports trade, which gives rise to negative impacts
on the labor market of developed countries. On the other hand, in China, the ability to
collective bargaining is also needed to balance interests and alleviate strife. With
regard to establishing a detailed mechanism of collective bargaining and unionism, it
is worthwhile to illustrate a typical picture of the labor market in the United States
since 1900. Unionism, as one of a number of significant factors, has made impressive
impacts on the labor market and the global economy. The conventional wisdom is that
unionism declines when the economy declines. The obvious exception to this general
rule was the Great Depression of the 1930’s when employers reneged on implicit
promises of job security and benefits creating a greater need for collective bargaining
and regulation.51 Generally, union membership in the United States displayed a ∩shaped pattern including the rise of membership of the non-agricultural labor force
during 1913-1955 and the fall of this rate from 1955 through the 21st century.52
Notably, union membership experienced the most rapid expansion in U.S. history
from 1935 to the mid-1950s when the union destiny rate increased from 13.2 per cent
to 34.7 percent.53 The percent of the nonagricultural labor force in organized unions
surpassed the absolute number of workers in labor organizations.54
The NLRA was amended in 1947 (under the Taft-Hartley Act) and 1959
(under the Landrum-Griffin Act), in order to limit and regulate the power of labor
unions to implement unfair labor practices and to carry out secondary activity.55 The
union leaders took action to reverse the status quo, merging the AFL and CIO into the
51

LABOR LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORKPLACE 107 (Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt et al. eds., 2d ed.
2009).
52
Emin M. Dinlersoz & Jeremy Greenwood, The Rise and Fall of Unions in the U.S. 4-7 (NAT’L
BUREAU OF ECON. RES., Working Paper No. 18079, 2012).
53
Craver, supra note 50, at 133; PHILIP TAFT, ORGANIZED LABOR IN AMERICAN HISTORY, N.Y.:
HARPER & ROW 471-72 (1st ed. 1964).
54
“The absolute number of individuals in labor organizations grew from 17,000,000 in 1955 to
22,000,000 in 1980. The percent of nonagricultural labor force participants in unions declined from 35
to 23.” For more information, see Craver, supra note 50, at 133, 147.
55
Craver, supra note 50, at 133.
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AFL-CIO because they believed it would be much stronger and effective as a
solidarity organization.56
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the American economy had changed
radically. Low-cost relocation and cost-saving technological developments weakened
most of the traditional industrial unions like the Auto Workers, the Steel Workers, and
the Electrical Workers.57 A relatively new industrial union – Change to Win – formed
in 2005, when a number of union officials58 who were not satisfied with AFL-CIO
and felt the leaders had not done enough to halt the decline of the labor movement,
withdrew from their original traditional union.59 During these times, unions were
devoted to increasing wages, lowering profits, and raising employees’ voices,
possibly having a positive effect on firms’ productivity.60 Unions also tend to
decrease profitability, which is why firms tend to not like unions. However,
increasing or decreasing the costs to maintain profitability will have different
consequences for social welfare.61 Generally, unions’ greatest contribution to a
society is raising workers’ share of income and workers’ voice in the firm and
government. Unions can stimulate the economy by raising workers’ wages because
they can afford to buy more goods. As the positive aspect of unions can offset the
negative aspects regarding social goods and the economy, the ongoing decline of
unionization is not good for unions, their members, or society overall because unions
do much social good.62 As analyzed above, collective bargaining and unionism are
necessary under the worldwide labor market in both the United States and China.
56

Jennifer Schramm, The Future of Unions, SOC’Y HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 2 (2005),
https://www.shrm.org/Research/FutureWorkplaceTrends/Documents/Visions1005.pdf.
57
Craver, supra note 50, at 137-38 &147.
58
Union officials in the SEIU, UFCW, UNITE-HERE, the Laborers, and the Teamsters.
59
Craver, supra note 50, at 149; See Daily Labor Report (B.N.A.) No. 115 (June 16, 2005) at AA-1.
60
RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMESL. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 189-90 (Basic Books, Inc., N.Y.,
1984).
61
Id. at 185, 188-89.
62
Id. at 250.
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B. CHALLENGES IN THE IMPERFECT LABOR MARKETS
The economy plays an important role in the changing labor market in terms of
both mobility and flexibility. It is important to analyze the labor market together with
both microeconomics and macroeconomics. Simply using the model of neoclassical
economic theory cannot comprehensively analyze imperfect labor markets because
the model assumes that labor markets work perfectly in complete competition.
Institutional Law and Economics (IL&E) theory, however, is much more convincing,
assuming that markets have gaps. The set of fundamental IL&E assumptions, such as
purpose of an economy, institutions, power, and modes of coordination, has an
orientation to labor and employment issues.63 Thus, this chapter applies IL&E theory
to analyze labor markets in China and America. Alternatively, I apply macroeconomic
theory to analyze labor markets under global conditions. There are three main
challenges in labor markets: unequal bargaining power, unemployment, and
externalities and social costs of labor, indicating that costs and benefits of employee
organizations and regulations between labor and management are needed in the
process of collective bargaining.64

1. Unequal Bargaining Power
Imperfect labor markets and unequal resources and rights indicate that
workers suffer inequality of bargaining power.65 In a perfect labor market,
competition forces firms to provide an optimal agreement including such terms and
conditions so as to keep or recruit their workforce, while employees can quit and find
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jobs somewhere else.66 However the real labor market is not always perfect. Within
an imperfect labor market, either employees or employers have the advantage.67 Most
often, the employer has a skewed power over workers. Compared to the power given
to management, workers feel pressured to bargain with employers.
For example, in an imperfect labor market, a firm sets wages rather than the
impersonal forces of demand and supply. In particular, since the economic reforms in
China, enterprises have become increasingly flexible in setting wages by means of
negotiation with a trade union, and enterprises have obtained more power to drive
wages down. Since Chinese economic reform, China has changed its labor market
from an administrated labor system to a mediated market system. A large number of
rural migrants have moved to urban areas, making the supply curve in those areas
shift to the right.
Figure 1(2) demonstrates this problem. In the figure, wage (W1) is lower than
the competitive wage (W2) at the point of employment (L1) (meaning that a firm only
employs workers when doing so will increase profits up to the point L1 where
MRP=MCL and not beyond). This results in a rise of exploitation of labor.68 The firm,
therefore, may cut down wages or pay a competitive wage (W2) at the expense of
reducing workers’ other terms and conditions of employment.69
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Figure 1(2)70

Further, regardless of whether labor markets are perfect or not, labor may also
face unequal bargaining power because the distribution of resources and rights favor
employers.71 Employers control ownership and property rights, creating unequal
bargaining power within the market, particularly under the employment-at-will
doctrine (shifting the supply curve to the right).72 Moreover, both employers and
consumers have self-interests in low wages, which improve their welfare at the
expense of labor.73 Because the employment relationship has always been unequal
and exploited, and firms have the market power to set wages, employee organizations
focus on raising wages and lowering prices, which means more income equality and a
greater employee voice in the economy and society.
Owing to the unequal power between labor and management, “good faith”
exchanges of relevant information during bargaining should be required. Imperfect
information or strategic behavior is another aspect of an imperfect labor market, and
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is one of the causes of strikes.74 The outcome of a strike can be improved when the
parties act for their collective interests, and cooperate; however, if both parties only
follow their individual interests and are inflexible, a strike will waste a portion of the
cooperative surplus.75
The United States government, therefore, may seek to promote cooperation
and discourage costly strategic behavior or strikes by means of prohibiting such
behavior and enforcing it with suitable fines, or creating laws governing collective
bargaining to avoid costly strategic behavior.76 For example, the government
disallows secondary boycotts to limit unions’ bargaining power to impose costs on
employers.77
Contrary to the U.S., China’s strikes are distinct, and doubled in 2014 with a
continuing shrinkage of the labor force. In this situation, workers may have a stronger
bargaining position, but the government’s political power still needs to be
reconsidered so as not to rely solely on officials’ desire for economic growth and
stability. Instead, the government, as a third party in the process of strikes, should
promote cooperation and discourage costly strikes. The existence of unequal
bargaining power signals that unions in the process of collective bargaining and
regulations could be very useful to govern imperfect markets with unequal resources.

2. Unemployment
During the post-war period, unemployment was generally low in the United
States. The full employment is located at the production possibility frontier,
demonstrating that the resources are being used efficiently in the production of goods
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and an output is accessible with the given inputs. Unemployment can consist of
frictional unemployment, or demand deficient unemployment. Frictional
unemployment occurs at full employment when there are always some people
between jobs. Demand deficient unemployment occurs when firms layoff workers as
a result of decreasing demand for a particular good. In order to keep the economy
closer to full employment, from the IL&E perspective, employment regulation has a
positive role in stabilizing the economy.78
With the rise of the global economy and new technological information,
another type of unemployment, involuntary unemployment proposed by Keynes in
1936, exists in most developing countries. Involuntary unemployment refers to a
worker having the will to accept the prevailing wage yet is unemployed, meaning that
unemployment shifts further inside the production possibility frontier at point X in
Figure 2(1).
Figure 2(1)
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In a primary labor market, which has higher wages, capital and knowledge-intensive
sectors resist wage cuts.79 If the higher wages continue or are set above the market
wages, in a semi-chronic condition, there will be an increasing excess of labor supply
in the primary labor market.80 Therefore, some workers in the primary labor market
will be unemployed because of the excess supply of labor. Under this situation, if
wages go down below the market wages in order to balance the supply and demand
curve, there will be chronic unemployment and a shortage of jobs at high wages firms,
likely resulting in a portion of the job seekers shifting to the low-wage secondary
labor market.81 The supply of secondary labor market workers, thus, will increase to
the rightward of the supply curve and further lower wages.
Involuntary unemployment has happened in China where wages have been
increasing since the last century. The wage increase made the supply curve shift to the
right; in particular, there is a serious imbalance in the labor market with labor
shortages or unemployment in some sectors and over-supply of labor in others. On the
one hand, in order to cut the labor costs of enterprises, for example, the majority of
workers currently in SOEs are not directly employed by the enterprises but rather by
an employment agency named Paiqian firms (a firm that employs workers but not use
their labor force) created by that enterprise in order to cut costs.82 Those workers who
have signed a dispatched contract are transferred to secondary labor markets and
obtain lower wages. Although the Chinese Labor Contract Law proposes, “equal pay
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for equal work”83, it is hard to require enterprises to implement this general rule
because the definition of equal work is so vague.
Bidding down the wage rate to gain employment, in general, is not an efficient
way to facilitate the supply and demand situation or alleviate worsened
unemployment, even in a perfect competitive economy.84 In other words, bidding
down wages cannot solve the supply and demand problem. Moreover, as wages go
down, the price of production will soon decrease and the real wage may actually
increase rather than decrease—which is what happened during the Great
Depression.85 Although the real wages increase, the purchase power of individuals is
deficient given the excess supply of production. On the other hand, wages reduction
can actually lead to a destabilizing downward helix in wages and prices, leading to a
capitalist catastrophe.86 A fall in wages below the original equilibrium level, like what
happened in the Great Recession, results in a destabilizing downward spiral of wages
because the aggregate supply has a more elastic negative slope than the aggregate
demand curve.87 As for the aggregate demand curve, the decline of wages decreases
household income and expenditure leads to leftward labor demand curves (D1 to D3
in Figure 2(2)), even if there is a positively sloped supply curve.88 Wage reduction,
therefore, has a negative impact on preventing a deflationary spiral and does not move
towards the production possibility frontier.89
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Figure 2 (2)90
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(2) Unemployment and destructive
Competition
On the other hand, in China, firms actually increase wages for formal workers
in order to recruit enough workers. The conventional understanding was that if money
wages increase it would induce national consumption ability. However, what actually
happened is that the high national saving rate resulted in poor consumption ability.
This remarkably high national saving rate has supported China’s high-investment,
export-led growth model. Once China’s export-led growth model is challenged by
labor-cost increases, from a macroeconomic perspective, enterprises might lose their
share in the global market. The response of the industries in the south and east coastal
provinces has been either to devote to wage increases and working condition
improvements, or to relocate to lower labor cost areas. 91 Wages in the remaining
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industries have increased by about 73 percent from 2004 to 2014 in Figure 3,92 which
should feed more domestic consumption and production.
Figure 3: Source from MOHRSS, China 93
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However, workers in these industries still have insufficient wages to improve
their consumption ability because their wages only cover basic subsistence. Under
such conditions, wage negotiation with the help of an employee organization would
probably raise wages and domestic consumption and give workers a larger say in the
economy and public policy. Therefore, wage negotiation between labor and
management with the help of an employee union organization in China is very
important and may help to balance interests in an efficient way.
Labor mobility is another important factor to solve the unemployment
problem and balance the supply and demand curve. There is a specific condition in
China that warrants discussion. Unemployment does not include xiagang workers,
92

China Average Yearly Wages 2004-2014, TRADING ECONOMICS,
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/wages, (last visited July 3, 2015).
93
Id.

21

which means there is a special unemployment phenomenon named underemployment.
According to the International Labor Organization, China’s unemployment statistics
do not include a proportion of layoff workers (xiagang) because these workers still
maintain an employment relationship with their employer even though they do not
work anymore.94 Some of these workers might work in other informal sectors as parttime workers, and are regarded as underemployed workers. This is to say that
unemployment rates are actually higher than the official data purports, excluding
workers who suffer from underemployment. The unemployment rate, thus, does not
comprehensively indicate underemployment conditions in China. Moreover,
underemployment has been a significant problem for over a decade without much
improvement, and requires a solution.
In order to resolve unemployment in urban areas, Hukou policy was set up in
the mid-1950s to control labor mobility and flexibility. Unless the labor force in a
particular province could not be found locally, employers were not allowed to recruit
workers from another province at that time. There was a change in the Hukou system
in 1997, allowing migrants to obtain “urban hukou” status if they had a stable income
or owned a house in small towns and cities. A further reform occurred in 2001 – a
person having a stable job or a residence could gain a hukou in more than 20,000
small towns and cities, while keeping their rights to use land in the countryside.95 In
the end, the Hukou system actually had a negative impact on labor mobility. For
example, in 2004 some labor-intensive industries located in eastern and southern
China could not recruit employees because of the limitation of Hukou, resulting in an
“insufficient supply of the labor.” Thus, labor mobility is important in China to
improve the current unemployment problem.
94
95
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From a macroeconomic perspective, a further step should be considered – a
macroeconomic stabilization measure. In the U.S., the New Deal labor program
including the Social Security Act (SSA), National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) has existed since 1935.96 Most of the New Deal
labor laws were enacted to protect employment conditions from the mass
unemployment of the 1930s. Employee unions play an important role in the process
of these laws. However, problems can arise if there is no regulation on employee
unions; the union may shift to “monopoly creating”97 and create greater negative
impacts such as lower productivity, inflation, and competitiveness.98 With respect to
union power, regulations are useful to minimize or maximize the power of unions to
produce more equitable results.99 For example, when union power was too weak in
the 1930s, the Wagner Act was enacted to promote union power; when union power
was too strong, however, the Taft-Hartley Amendments were passed to restrain union
power. In sum, the analysis of unemployment shows that efficient regulations can
protect the labor force from unemployment situations. Compared with the laws in the
United States, the Employment Promotion Law of the People’s Republic of China100
relies on the government to promote employment, which lacks rules on attendance of
an employee union, not to mention regulating unions. Other labor laws in China, such
as the Labor Contact Law and Trade Union Law, involve employee unions in, but
there are still problems with the process of collective negotiation, which will be
analyzed in the next chapter.
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3. Externalities and the Social Costs of Labor
Although externalities affect both sides of in the labor market, they have a
considerably negative effect on workers; notably, employers can often shift private
production costs onto workers, their families, and other third parties as a form of
social cost.101 Since social cost102 includes fundamental human and social rights in the
workplace, the fact that these rights have no market value and are therefore do not
enter into enterprise resource planning and human resources practices, employment
regulation cost shift in order to prevent or redress injured parties.103 A shift of social
labor cost is promoted by a large supply of labor in the market. For example, in the
United States, large-scale immigration has transferred into the nation. As a result, in
order to balance the supply and demand curve of the labor market, wages may have to
fall to such an extent that it will not cover the minimum subsistence cost of labor.104
In China, large numbers of rural migrants transferred to urban areas, causing firms to
displace formal employees by means of recruiting a cheaper labor force from rural
areas. Given that the labor market is not full employment, it is easy for firms, and then
consumers, to shift the burden of labor costs to others, such as workers who are
underpaid by firms with labor market power.105 Workers, therefore, should be granted
legal or human rights with the help of a union to address the social wage vanishing
externality/social cost problem.106 Regulation of the employment labor market also
facilitates greater economic efficiency and maintains the economy on the production
possibility frontier.107 In particular, without any employment regulation, greater
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insecurity makes workers less productive.108 Thus, externalities and social costs of
labor indicate that regulations are an efficient way to satisfy workers’ demands and
promote productivity.
In conclusion, from these three challenges, it is clear that regulations on
collective bargaining are important in an imperfect labor market. During the process
of collective bargaining, unions are necessary to balance bargaining power and
improve employment conditions by means of raising wages and lowering prices with
an ambiguous impact on total productivity. Regarding the costs and benefits of
employee organizations, unions raise wages and lower prices at the expense of lower
profits, giving employers an incentive to flee to non-union workplaces. As for China,
employee organizations would probably raise wages and domestic consumption and
provide workers with a larger voice in the economy and public policy. To some
degree, it might give some employers motive to move inland or other low-cost labor
countries, like Viet Nam. From my perspective, the benefits of employee
organizations outweigh their costs in the process of collective bargaining.

III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYMENT PROTECTIONS IN THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND UNITED STATES

A. OVERVIEW OF LABOR LAWS ON THE PROTECTIONS OF WORKER'S
DEMANDS
There are three types of laws governing China’s labor standards: statutory
laws, administrative laws, and international laws, and most of them were adopted in
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the last two decades.109 Statutory laws are enacted by the National People’s Congress
and its standing committee. The Labor Law of 1994 was the first comprehensive labor
standards law in China. Although the law covers minimum wage, child labor, working
hours, protection of women, forced labor, collective bargaining and collective
contracts, over time pay, and many other areas,110 but a lack of supporting policies
and laws prevented the implementation of the law. The Labor Law has been revised
since the Labor Contract Law was passed in 2008 and went into effected in 2009. In
2013, Section 2 of Chapter 5 of the Labor Contract Law concerning worker dispatch
service was revised. The Trade Union Law of 1992 addressed labor unions including
collective contracts, settlement of labor disputes, and management decisions of
workers. In order to encourage union participation by workers, the Reform of the
Trade Union Law of 2001, added to Article 3 that prohibits and limits improper
behavior that attempts to impede workers from joining or forming unions. The Law
also added to Article 10 that requires enterprises to establish unions at their plants if
the number of members is more than 25, otherwise, enterprises may establish unions.
More importantly, the law added a chapter on legal responsibilities regulating
improper conduct that violates the laws. With the enactment of this law, China has
established the largest network of trades unions with memberships currently
exceeding 150 million up to the middle of year 2006.111 Unions in State sectors are all
unionized with a high percentage of participation, while non-state sectors in urban
areas are partially unionized.112
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Due to the insufficiency of statutory law within particular areas, Chinese
administrative agencies have enacted administrative laws to regulate a particular field.
Administrative law is also an important means to amend the existing statutory law.
The Provisions on Collective Contracts (1994) was issued to regulate the particular
field of collective contracts, but was superseded by the Provisions on Collective
Contracts (2004). The Provisions on Collective Contracts (2004) added new chapters
on the contents of collective negotiation, the representatives of collective negotiation,
and the changing of collective contracts.
There has been increasing international pressure on China regarding its labor
standards, since China entered into WTO. The International Labor Organization
(ILO), the United Nation’s labor agency, has developed a set of core labor standards
and a tripartite system. In 2001, China created a national tripartite system
(‘sanfangjizhi’) to deal with serious industrial relations strife. 113 However, the
Chinese tripartite system is not use efficient because the government authority in this
system is not neutral and independent from the labor relationship between labor and
management.114
In the United States, the Wagner Act (1953) was issued in order to support
unionization, collective bargaining, and reduce strife by giving workers political and
economic power.115 During the New Deal, the National Labor Relation Board was set
up to administer over claims of unfair labor practices and interpret unfair labor
practice and representation provisions of the Wagner Act.116 Under the Wagner Act,
unionism increased since the Great Depression of the 1920s. The Wagner Act
113
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contained no limitations on the activities of unions.117 By the late 1940s, business
people had become worried about the expanding membership and economic power of
the labor movement. Such fear led to the Traft-Hartley Act of 1947 and the LandrumGriffin Act of 1959 Amendments to the NLRA, which reduced the power of unions
by, for example, forbidding certain union “bad practices” and regulating unions'
internal affairs and union officials' relationships with employers.118 The statute shows
a shift from encouraging unionization to a neutral position as well as protecting
employees from coercion.119

B. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ABILITY OF THE CHINESE
LABOR LAWS AND AMERICAN LABOR LAWS TO STATISFY WORKERS’
DEMANDS

1. The Definition of Employee
In China, the Provisions on Collective Contracts120 and the Labor Contract
Law of the People’s Republic of China (Labor Contract Law)121 use the term
“employee” to describe people who enjoy the right to organize and bargain
collectively under these statutes. According to Article 20 of the Provisions on
Collective Contract, employee representatives shall be elected by the corresponding
trade union. In an enterprise without an employee trade union, representatives may be
recommended by the employees in a democratic way and be approved with the
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consent of more than 50% of the employees.122 This raises the question: who is the
employee in the labor-management relationship?
The employee/employer relationship is described in Article 2 Part 1 of the
Labor Contract Law: “this law shall apply to the establishment of employment
relationship between employees and enterprises, individual economic organizations,
private non-enterprises, or other organizations (hereafter referred to as employers),
and to the formation, fulfillment, change, dissolution, or termination of labor
contracts.”123 Employees, therefore, are workers having labor relationships with
employers. Under the laws, there is no clear definition of who is an “employee”.
Instead of defining the “employee”, Chinese legislators use an indirect way to define
it by defining certain employers. Article 2 of the Labor Contract Law defines
employers as enterprises, individual economic organizations, private non-enterprises
entities, or other organizations.
Another important factor in figuring out who is an employee under the law is
the labor relationship referred to in the law. Labor relationships are governed by the
labor contract law and are different from service relationships that are regulated by
the civil laws. In additional to Article 2 of the Labor Contract Law, labor relationships
appear in Article 7 of the Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Several
Issues about the Application of Laws for the Trial of Labor Dispute Cases (II), which
states that the following relationships are not labor relationships: “4) a dispute
between a family or individual and a family service provider; 5) a dispute between a
private craftsman and a helper or apprentice; and 6) a dispute over a rural contractor
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and a person he has employed.”124 Article7 of the Interpretation (III) of the Supreme
People’s Court of Several Issues on the Application of Law in the Trial of Labor
Dispute Cases excludes the relationship between “ an employer and an employee who
has already enjoyed pension insurance treatments or received pensions pursuant to the
law when he is employed by the employer”125 from the definition of the labor
relationship but the service relationship. Article 8 of the Interpretation (III) of the
Supreme People’s Court of Several Issues on the Application of Law in the Trial of
Labor Dispute Cases takes the relationships as labor relationship when “a employees
of an new employer, but the employee who is on leave with pay suspension, has
retired under the statutory age of retirement, is removed from post or waiting for a
post or is on a long leave due to the former enterprise's operational cessation of
production with the former employer” 126 instead this is a service relationship.
According to the definitions of employer and labor relationships, an employee shall
include employees working and having labor relationships with enterprises, individual
economic organization entities, or other organizations, and shall not include a family
service provider, a helper of private craftsman or apprentice, and a person employed
by a rural contractor. Aside from these three exclusions, the definition of the
employee is still obscure under the law.
In contrast, the definition of the employee in the United States is more explicit
and detailed in the law. Section 2(3) of the NLRA states:
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“The definition of employee shall include any employee, and
shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless
the Act explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual
whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any
current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who
has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent
employment, but shall not include any individual employed as an
agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person
at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or
any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any
individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an
employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to
time, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein
defined.”127
Although the NLRA's definition of employee includes "any employee," it also
expressly lists the exceptions: independent contractors128, supervisors129, and
employees covered by the Railway Labor Act.130 Case law has also excluded
managerial employees and confidential employees from the NLRA through Bell
Aerospace Co. Division131 and Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership.132 And
employees who were endowed with managerial status in determining the central
policies of their employer are also excluded from the NLRA under Yeshiva (1980).133
The court exempted certain charge nurses and defined them not as supervisors
because of their exercise of professional, technical, or experienced judgment based on
their professional employee status.134
Comparing to the implementation of “employee” sections in the laws of the
two countries, it is harder to determine the “employee” definition in labor disputes in
China. The main reason is that in China is that the “employee” definition is derived
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from the employees of Sated-owned enterprises model,135 which does not reflect the
current labor market and impedes economic development. Despite this flaw, labor
relationships are nevertheless regulated under such model, resulting in numerous
labor disputes. 136 In particular, employees from rural areas were included for the first
time under the Labor Contract Law of 2008. 137 However, rural employees could not
obtain benefits from public services because they are not registered as citizens who
obtain benefits from “City Houkou”.138 Public services, such as the Public
Employment Service and Union Services, have begun to provide services to rural
workers since 2003, but social insurance benefits are still hard to obtain if workers
comes from rural areas.139 Although rural employees are real employees protected by
the Labor Contract Law, a lack of supporting policies and a detailed definition
encompassing their unique perspective resulted in rural employees working in poor
conditions for a long time.140 As shown in Figure 4, the total number of rural
employees has been decreasing since 2009, but it is still higher than the total number
of urban employees.141 It is critical for legislators to review the definition of the
employees, and most notably, to review rural employees to ensure that their rights are
protected and enforced. With a greater coverage of employees, unions would have a
better chance to organize a larger percent of employees in a certain plant and
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nationally as well.142 A broad definition of employee favors greater union bargaining
power on the premise of a comprehensive collective bargaining mechanism, and vice
versa.

in million

Figure 4: The urban and rural workforce in China 143
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As the information technology changes have occurred in production, in the
United States, production has become more decentralized, and more skilled
employees have greater free choice to work.144 The narrow definition of employee
under the NLRA has excluded a larger share of the workforce.145 In addition, with
increased international trade, national borders have showed less importance in
collective bargaining.146 For example, Japanese workers are protected under Japanese
labor law with broader coverage of the employee definition, so they can still can
bargain with employers who shift production to low-wage workers overseas.147 Thus,
broader coverage is increasingly important in the new global economy. Boarder
coverage of employees is significant for both China and the United States.
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2. Organizing and Bargaining Rights of Employees
In order to analyze the rights of employees, it is first helpful to know how to
set up trade unions are set up in China. Although the official All China Federation of
Trade Unions (ACFTU) is a “monolithic organization”,148 there is considerable
variation within ACFTU in terms of union organizing strategies. Unions are top-down
organizations classified into the national ACFTU, local trade union federations
(Defang Gonghui),149 industry trade union federations (Chanye Gonghui),150 and
grassroots trade unions (Jiceng Gonghui).151
In the traditional official unions model, the national ACFTU sets up grassroots
unions relying on organizing quotas by obtaining the approval of employers instead of
mobilizing and organizing workers per se.152 Under such conditions, although this
dominant pattern of union organizing has rapidly increased the ACFTU's membership,
it may cause the grassroots unions to become completely dependent upon employers
and become more or less irrelevant to Chinese workers.153 The official grassroots
unions designated by high-level official unions provide welfare,154 and pass on
workers demands to employers. Depending on whether workers have a good
employer, or, these unions might rarely represent workers.155 As for unions in Statedowned enterprises (SOEs), the official grassroots unions are totally top-down unions
under the direction of the national ACFTU, so employees in state sectors have been
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thoroughly unionized with an over 90 percent labor participation rate.156 The
establishment of unions in non-stated-owned enterprises is more or less harder
depending on the employer in the traditional model. In this chapter, I discuss the
establishment of grassroots unions in non-stated-owned enterprises. Even though the
Trade Union Law says that neither an employer nor any party could prohibit union
organization, employers in non-state-owned enterprises might have a negative attitude
towards organizing preventing high-level unions from setting up units in these
companies. Quanzhou Difang Gonghui157 (Quanzhou local union), however, has tried
a novel way to get developing workers becoming union members to have a union
committee in order to organize units at Walmart without depending on the
enterprise’s human resource department to set up a pre-union group (Gonghui
Choubei group)158 and instead of a totally top-down unions designed by the higher
level official union. The President in the Quanzhou local union is like a union
organizer in the process of organizing a unit. It took 10 years to establish the union at
Walmart, which was finally set up in 2006.159 However, after the union was set up at
Walmart, and even though workers joining in the unit have increased to 500
members,160 there are still large numbers of workers who are afraid to become
members of the union because the lack of protections in the law allow employers to
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continue unfair labor practice.161 Because of the insufficiency of the laws, it is hard to
implement collective bargaining in reality, and workers’ demands are hard to satisfy.
Although reforms in the Trade Union Law (2001), which forbids supervisors
or managers from joining grassroots unions, resulted in greater independence, there
are still some problems in the Trade Union Law making it hard to apply in practice.
Article 10 of the Trade Union Law says that the trade union of an enterprise with
more than 25 members shall establish a grassroots trade union committee; if there are
less than 25 members, a grassroots trade union committee may be established
separately, or a grassroots trade union committee may be set up jointly by members of
two units or more; or an organizer may be elected to organize various activities for
members.162 And Article 11 says that high-level unions could assist and direct
workers to set up a union, and any firms should not prohibit workers from doing so.163
In Article 51164 and 52,165 it only states that employers should not prohibit workers
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from establishing a union, but it does not provide enough remedies if employers break
the laws, such as the “reasonable reasons” stated in the law are unclear and lack of
certain redress to workers who are interfered with by employers when organizing
movements or protecting rights activities. Moreover, the members referred to in
Article 10 are confused because before setting up the grassroots union how do the
workers become members of the union? Nevertheless, in practice, there are two
approaches to set up a trade union.
First, relying on the human resources department of a company, the company
can set up a pre-union group (Gonghui Choubei group) to discuss with workers
whether to set up a union or not. If they all agree to do so, the next step is getting
members to register. The third step is to unite these members to set up a union
committee and then hold a conference to conduct a democratic vote for selecting the
president, vice president, and committee members. The last step is to get approval
from the high-level union and authorized leaders in the union. Second, if the
company’s human resources department does not initiate the establishment of a preunion group, the president or other leaders in a high-level trade union could persuade
workers to be union members without depending on the enterprise level. And then
these members should or could set up the grassroots union committee if they are more
than 25 members or less than 25. The next step is a democratic vote among these
members in the company to select the president, vice-president, and committee
members. If the members in a firm are less than 25, it is easier for a firm that might
public security departments shall give punishment according to the regulations on punishment with
respect to management of pubic security.” Id. art.51.
165
“In any of the following cases in which the provisions of this Law are violated, the administrative
department for labor shall order that the victim be reinstated, his remuneration payable during the
period of the termination of the labor contract be made up, or that a compensation two times the
amount of his annual income be given: 1) the employees’ labor contracts are cancelled because of the
employees’ participation in trade union activities; or 2) the labor contracts of the trade union working
personnel are cancelled because of their performance of the duties provided for by this Law”, Id. art.52.
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hold a negative attitude to neither respond to setting up the union committee nor
prohibit the set up of one. The last step to organizing the grassroots union is
authorizing the union leaders to the high-level union and getting an approval from the
high-level union. In the grassroots union pattern, it is easier for employers to control
the process of organizing grassroots union in most conditions and they play a major
role in shaping the outcomes for industrial relations, therefore, more details and
explanations in the laws should be given.166 Since some industrial workplaces have
suffered from shortages of workers, however, workers having skills in high demand
might gain bargaining power and force the official grassroots union to genuinely
represent the workers some day in the future.167
Besides the traditional ACFTU and its grassroots unions’ system, there are
two types of new systems: the Gonghui Lianhehui (one of the Union Association
Patterns)168 and the Hangye Gonghui (one of the unions associations)169. The
traditional grassroots union occurs in most conditions in both SOEs and non-Stateowned enterprises, while the Gonghui Lianhehui and the Hangye Gonghui mostly
organize their movement in small non-State-owned enterprises, such as small POEs
(Private-owned Enterprises), FIEs (Foreign-invested Enterprises), and IOBs
(Individually-owned Business). Compared with the traditional trade union, in these
new systems the employers only play a limited role in shaping the union organizing
because they do not have any effective means of preventing or controlling unions
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from being established.170 In the Gonghui lianhehui, the regional unions directly set
up union associations without the need of employer agreement, by means of direct
leading and appointing their own staffs as union leaders, like the president. Although
Gonghui lianhehui pattern unions are more independent from employers, they are
highly dependent on regional unions and further on the state administration, which
might make concessions to firms in order to give top priority to economy growth.171
In the Hangye Gonghui system, with the help of the government and high-level union,
the regional trade union council decides to organize union associations by trade. In
order to reverse the shortage of workers in small POEs, the Hangye Gonghui has been
established for certain purposes to collectively negotiate wages and other issues
related to working conditions, which makes this kind of union more representative.172
It is able to transform the administrative union power of the government into
bargaining power under certain conditions.173 Although this form of unions is not
common, the Labor Contract Law (2008) Article 53174 recognizes regional collective
bargaining contracts and industry-based collective contracts, which may facilitate this
kind of union.175
In conclusion, the unions in China are not completely independent, which is
hard to change due to complicated conditions, but Chinese legislators could try to
figure out a more efficient approach to satisfy workers’ demands by establishing the
real trade unions. Article 2 and 3 of the Trade Union Law in China ensure the
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employees’ right to join or form a union shall not be restricted and that any party shall
not refrain employees from joining the union.176 Article 7 of the Provisions on
Collective Contracts (1995)177 provides the definition of collective bargaining: the
union or representatives of employees bargain with the representative of an employer
to reach a collective agreement.178 The definition of collective bargaining is not in the
Provisions on Collective Contracts (2004). In March 2015, the administrative
department of labor issued “the draft of Provisions on Collective Contracts and Labor
Contract Law” adding terminology and explanations into laws, such as collective
bargaining, collective contract, and representative of collective negotiation.179
Compared to China, obstructions confronted by the United States during the
organization of unions are dealt with differently under the National Labor Relations
Act and the Railway Labor Act, which have changed this aspect of the labor and
management relationship.180 The National Labor Board authorized by the NLRA
determines employees’ choice of a collective bargaining unit.181 In the NLRA,
Section 7 guarantees the rights of employees to join, form, and assist in organizing
their own organizations, and to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own organization.182 If such rights are affected by an agreement requiring

“Trade unions are mass organizations formed by the working classes of their own free will. . . .
[Workers] shall have the right to participate in and form trade union organizations pursuant to the
law…no organization or individual may hinder them from doing so or restrict them.” Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Gonghui Fa (中华人民共和国工会法) [The Trade Union Law], supra note 162,
art.2, 3.
177
Jiti Hetong Guiding (集体合同规定) [Provision on Collective Contracts] (promulgated by the
Ministry of Labor and Social Security(dissolved), Dec. 15, 1994, non-effective), art.7 (Lawinfochina)
(China).
178
Id. art.7.
179
Guanyu Zhengqiu Laodong Hetong Guifan Deng Sanxiang Gongjia Biaozhun Yijian De Han (关于
征求《劳动合同规范》等 3 项国家标准意见的函) [The National Standard Letter on Opinions of
Labor Contracts], ADMIN. DEP’T LAB. (Feb. 27, 2015),
http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/SYrlzyhshbzb/zxhd/SYzhengqiuyijian/201502/t20150227_152665.htm.
180
James L. Jr. Hall & H. Leonard Court, Selecting a Union Representative: Management's Role, 26
OKLA. L. REV. 38, 38 (1973); 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970); Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.
(1970).
181
29 U.S.C. § 159; 45 U.S.C. § 152; Hall & Court, supra note 180, at 39.
182
29 U.S.C. § 158.
176

40

membership as a condition of employment, employees shall not have the right to
refrain from such activities.183 Section 8 (a)’s184 “unfair labor practice” basically
involves interference with the rights granted to employees under Section 7. Generally,
employer’s unfair labor practices are “coercion on employees in the exercise of the
rights in section 7; domination or interference with formation or administration of any
labor organization; discrimination regard with hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
organization; discrimination or discharge an employee who has filed charges or given
testimony under this Act; refusal bargaining collectively with exclusive
representatives of employees.”185 When the Board processes a charge, the board shall
consider evidence of the employer’s misconduct as follows: employer cannot express
or imply anything related to union organization by means of threating,186
interrogating,187 promising188 and spying.189
Compared to these sections, the challenge of organizing in China is the topdown system of organizing unions, which resulted in the grassroots union relying on
the administration of high-level union guidance or the willingness of employer’s. In
addition, the lack of procedural rules prevents the protection of employees’ rights to
organize unions despite the fact that Article 3 of the Trade Union Law ensures
employees’ rights to join and form unions. Even though established unions have been
183
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increased in recent years since the policy of the government has been to support
organize unions in China, unions still fail to sufficiently satisfy workers’ basic
subsistence demands, not mention to bargain for them. Therefore, in order to
strengthen workers’ organizing rights, Chinese legislators, on the one hand, should
reconsider how to motivate workers’ to organize real, useful unions, and on the other
hand, clearly point out employer’s unfair labor practices during the process of
organizing in order to relieve workers’ fear of joining, forming, or assisting unions.

3. Remedies for Improper Conducts of Employers
Because unfair labor practices might be conducted by employers, remedies are
important for non-offending parties to require the employer to bargain with the union.
In the United States, the main bargaining remedies for unfair labor practices of
employers are as follows: the NLRB can set aside the election and order another one
at the request of the union if the Board finds that the employer or the union has
committed unfair labor practices, created confusion or fear of reprisals and thus
interfered with the employees' freedom of choice.190
A cease and desist order191 will be issued with the notice-posting order if the
employer violates Section 8(a)(1) (interfering with or coercing employees), which is
devoted to either redressing improper conduct or preventing its recurrence.192 Further,
as violations have become more complicated and measured the usual remedies like
reinstatement, back pay, and notice-posting orders were not enough to prevent or
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redress the occurrence of unfair labor practices.193 The Board may require some
affirmative action to remedy the union when the employer violates the NLRA through
severe conducts, such as requiring the employer to give the union a chance to present
its views to workers at a plant during working hours.194 For instance, in Stevens,195 the
Board required the employer to mail notices to all employees concerning the
misconduct;196 gave the union and its representatives reasonable access to the plant
for one year, beginning with the issuance date of the decision to its bulletin boards;197
and required the employer to read the notifications of the intent to conduct the unfair
labor practices to employees during work time meetings at their plants.198 The Second
Circuit in Stevens199 approved most parts of the order, only refusing the requirements
of names and address provided by the employer.
A bargaining order shall be issued if the employer committed substantial
unfair labor practices as well as if the union has achieved majority support by
authorization cards. In Gissel,200 the Court held that a bargaining order is the remedy
for Section 8(a)(5) violations. The Supreme Court discussed the degree of unfair labor
practices that would result in a bargaining order. First, a bargaining order should be
imposed without inquiring into the card authorization, if the employer committed
“outrageous and pervasive” unfair labor practices.201 Second, in “less extraordinary”
cases, if the employer implemented less “pervasive” unfair labor practices tending to
undermine majority strength and impede the election processes, the Board would
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issue a bargaining order where the union at one point had a majority, and recognizing
the importance of employees’ free choice.202 Third, if the unfair labor practices have
no negative impacts on the election process, a bargaining order will not be
commanded.203 In certain refusal to bargain situations, however, a bargaining order
might not be enough.204 The Board may order a bonus to be paid or order the
employer to fulfill the agreement reached previously.205
Compared to the United States, the Trade Union Law in China provides
insufficient compensations for non-offending workers or union members. Article 50
of the Trade Union Law says that any organization that “obstruct the employees from
participating in or organizing trade unions according to law or that obstruct the trade
unions at the next higher levels from assisting and giving guidance in the
establishment of trade union shall be ordered by the administrative department of
labor to make corrections; those refusing to make corrections shall be submitted by
the administrative department of labor to the government at the level of county or
above for solution; those causing serious results by the means of violence or threats
and constituting crimes shall be investigated into for criminal responsibilities.” 206
Article 51 says that organization that “make vindictive attacks by transferring
the working personnel of trade unions performing their duties according to law from
their posts without justified reasons shall be ordered by the administrative department
of labor to make corrections; and shall make compensation if any loss is caused.
202

395 U.S. 575, 614 (1969).
395 U.S. 575, 615 (1969).
204
Fanning, supra note 192, at 263.
205
Id. at 263-64.
206
“In violation of the provisions of Article 3, Article 11 of this Law that obstruct the employees from
participating in or organizing trade unions according to law or that obstruct the trade unions at the next
higher levels from assisting and giving guidance in the establishment of trade unions shall be ordered
by the administrative department of labor to make corrections; those refusing to make corrections shall
be submitted by the administrative department of labor to the people’s governments at the level of
county or above for handling; those causing serious results by the means of violence or threats and
constituting crimes shall be investigated into for criminal responsibilities.” Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Gonghui Fa (中华人民共和国工会法) [The Trade Union Law], supra note 162, art.50.
203

44

Those that insult, defame or make personal injuries to the trade union working
personnel performing duties according to law, and have thus committed crimes, the
public security departments shall give punishment according to the regulations on
punishment with respect to management of public security”.207
Article 52 says that “the administrative department of labor, under the
following circumstances, shall order to resume the employees’ work and reissue the
remunerations that should be paid during the cancellation of labor contracts, or order
to make double compensation of the annual income of the employees: 1) the
employees’ labor contracts are cancelled because of their participation in trade union
activities; or 2) the labor contracts of the trade union members are cancelled due to
the performance of his duties provided by this Law”.208
Article 53 says that any organization that “in violation of the provisions of this
law, commits any of the following acts shall be ordered to make corrections and be
dealt with by the people’s governments at the level of county or above according to
law: 1) hindering the trade union organizations in organizing the employees to
exercise the democratic rights through the employee representative assemblies or
other forms according to law; 2) illegally cancelling or consolidating the trade union
organizations; 3) hindering the trade unions from participating in the investigation and
handling of the job-related accidents resulting in fatality or personal injuries of the
employees and other infringement upon the legal rights and interests of the employees;
and 4) refusing to make equal negotiation without justified reasons”.209
These remedies above are partially similar to the function of a cease and desist
order for illegal behavior and a compensation order in the United States. For example,
transferring union members without justified reasons violates Article 51, so the
207
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employer will be issued a corrective order by the administrative department of labor
and shall also make compensation if any loss is caused. And Article 52 emphatically
states that the administrative department of labor shall issue an order of correction to
resume working, as well as reissue the remunerations that should be paid during the
cancellation of labor contracts, if the employer discharges workers because of their
joining and organizing union.
The Trade Union Law seemingly guarantees workers’ rights to join and
organize the trade union, but in reality some workers are not willing to join or
organize a union. There are three possible reasons why some workers are not willing
to join and organize unions: workers have better wages and good working conditions;
workers do not think the unions can help; workers are threatened by the employer.
According to the surveys at Walmart in Beijing, Shenzhen, and Kunming, a large
number of temporary workers have wages lower than about 3 yuan per hour. The
workers are not satisfied with their wages, which are below the minimum wage set by
law.210 Despite these conditions, some workers do not want join and organize a union
because they do not believe in the union and are afraid of threats from their employer.
Analyzing the deficiencies of the Trade Union Law regarding remedies for
misconducts of the employer could provide a better understanding on how to satisfy
workers’ demands.
Article 50, 51, and 52, separately provide remedies for improper behavior of
the employer. These remedies are issued as corrective orders by the administrative
department of labor. If the employer refuses to make a correction, the administrative
department of labor will submit it to the government at the level of county or above
Gaiyou Shuilai Zujian Gonghui? (该由谁来组建工会?) [Who will Take Charge to set up the
Union?], Vol. 53 Zhongguo Laogong Tongxun Dianzi Bao (中国劳工通讯电子报第 53 期) [CHINA
LAB. BULL. NEWSL.] (Aug. 8, 2006), http://www.clb.org.hk/schi/content/中国劳工通讯电子报第 53
期-0.
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county. This rule greatly depends on the administrative department of labor, which
can often ignore the administrative pressure and overlook the improper behavior of
employers. In contrast, under the same conditions in the United States, besides the
cease and desist order for illegal conducts, the Board may give unions access to the
plant to present their views. Moreover, Article 52 makes it illegal for employers to
discharge employees who join “union activities”. However, some small enterprises
still do not set up their grassroots union. Workers in these companies have no choice
but to self-organize while they are in bad working conditions. Self-organized workers
bargain collectively with employers without the union, and therefore, these workers
are easily fired because of the lacking protections of Article 52.211 Section 7 of the
NLRA, on the other hand, guarantees employees’ rights to self-organization. If
China’s government cannot include self-organization in the laws to satisfy workers’
demands, at least it should reconsider the remedies for those self-organized workers.
Article 53 (4) also has problems that need to be reconsidered. First, how to
define justified reasons and which institution should determine justified reasons.
According to the Act, the government has the authorization to set the justified reasons,
rather than the administrative department of labor or the court. In reality, the
government’s goals are stability, economic prosperity, and harmonization; therefore,
in order to pursue these goals, the government might be inclined to provide
concessions at the expense of workers’ demands. Second, the “correction” in this
subsection means not to refuse an equal negotiation. It is like a bargaining order under
the condition that the employer does not have justified reasons. Seemingly, it has
increased unions’ bargaining power. Under most conditions, workers submit their

For more information, see Zhuanjia Lüshi Jianyi Xiugai Gonghui Fa (专家律师建议修改《工会法》
条款) [Scholars and Lawyers Give Advice on Revising the Trade Union Law], Caixin Wang (财新网)
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demands to the government through the special process “shangfang” (letters and
visits).212 The government issues a corrective order to lead a negotiation between
labor and management. Once the employer has still refused to bargain or negotiation
has failed, the workers have to resubmit their demands to high-level government or
find an alternative way to pursue their demands, such as arbitration.213 During this
process, although the union can be the subject of law according to Article 2 of
“Regulation on Complaint Letters and Visits”,214 the union is not actually in the
process of “shangfang”. Its function is relieving conflicts as the third party during the
process, but not to be the representative of the workers. Thus, clearly guaranteeing the
union as a subject of law during the “shangfang” process is necessary to achieve an
equal negotiation. Nonetheless, employers always have negative attitudes and lose
their motivation, unless there is an immediate economic reason for negotiation.
Therefore, workers have no choice but to strike. For example, in December 2014,
Guangzhou Fanyulide Shoes Co.’s workers held a strike under the direction of the
union, and the next day the employer made a negotiation with them.215 Although
many of these workers strikes have resulted in higher wages or other benefits, these
strikes with "Chinese characteristics" also increase the real costs of employers and
212

Xinfang Tiaoli (信访条例) [Regulation on Complaint Letters and Visits], (promulgated by the ST.
COUNCIL , Jan. 10, 2005, effective May 1, 2005) (Lawinfochina) (China), art. 2. “The term "complaint
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some strike leaders are fired and sometimes in jailed.216 Therefore, reconsideration of
these problems in Article 53 (4) of the Trade Union Law is very important.
In the last part of Article 50 and 51, although the employer is responsible for
his egregious improper conducts related to criminal workers’ personal injuries and
serious results, there is no remedy for workers when it is impossible to hold a free and
fair election. Compared to these Articles, in the United States, if the employer
committed egregious unfair labor practices, the remedy is to issue a bargaining order
without a need for the authorization cards by the Board. Issuing a bargaining order
under such conditions is another important issue that should be reconsidered and
added into the Trade Union Law.

IV. OTHER EMPLOYMENT PROTECTIONS – ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION

A. A REVIEW ON THE LAWS OF ARBITRATIONS IN THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES
In order to satisfy workers’ demands in an efficient way, alternative dispute
resolutions, notably arbitration, should become another approach to relieve labor
strife. In China, arbitrations are not clearly divided into labor and employment
arbitration. Collective labor disputes and individual labor disputes follow the same
process of arbitration process controlled by law. The following laws are the main
rules regulating arbitration and its process.
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Halegua, supra note 7.
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First, regarding the process before and during the arbitration, Article 5 of the
Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China
(2007)217 states:
“If a party does not desire a consultation where a labor dispute arises,
the parties fail to settle the dispute through consultation, or a party
does not execute a reached settlement agreement, any party may apply
to a mediation organization for mediation; if a party does not desire a
mediation, the parties fail to settle the dispute through mediation, or a
party does not execute a reached mediation agreement, any party may
apply to a labor dispute arbitration commission for arbitration; and a
party disagreeing to an arbitral award may bring an action in the
people's court except as otherwise provided for by this Law.”218
This article indicates that, under the law, arbitration is a compulsory
arbitration step before the parties can litigate. The workers and employers cannot skip
the mandatory arbitration process to litigate in court.
In addition, Article 41 and 42 address the process of arbitration. Article 41
states that even after one of the two parties apply for arbitration of a labor dispute, the
two parties may reach a settlement on their own. The application for arbitration can be
dropped while a settlement agreement is reached.219 Article 42 of this law reads:
“Before rendering an award, an arbitral tribunal shall conduct
mediation. If an agreement is reached through mediation, an arbitral
tribunal shall make a mediation record… a mediation record shall take
effect after being signed by both parties. An arbitral tribunal shall
timely render an arbitration award where mediation fails or one party
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goes back on the agreement reached before a mediation record is
served.”220
Regarding the mediation record, Article 11 of the Interpretation (III) of the
Supreme People’s Court of Several Issues on the Application of Law in the Trial of
Labor Dispute Cases states that: “Where a mediation record made by the labor and
personnel dispute arbitration committee has taken effect, and one party goes back on
the agreement reached and attempts to litigate, the people's court shall not accept such
a case; or if it has accepted the case, shall make a ruling to dismiss it.”221
During the process of arbitration, evidence rules in Article 6 of the Labor
Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law indicate: “A party shall be responsible for
adducing evidence to back up its claims. The employer shall provide the evidence
related to the disputed matter where the evidence is controlled by an employer; the
employer who fails to provide the evidence shall bear the adverse consequences.”222
Regarding collective labor disputes, Article 7 reads: “Where a labor dispute
involves more than ten employees and the employees have a common claim, they
may choose one worker to represent them in the mediation, arbitration, or

Id. art.42. “Before rendering an award, an arbitral tribunal shall conduct mediation first. Where an
agreement is reached through mediation, an arbitral tribunal shall make a mediation record. A
mediation record shall expressly state the arbitral claims and results of agreement by the parties. A
mediation record shall be signed by the arbitrators, on which the seal of the labor dispute arbitration
commission shall be affixed, and served on both parties. A mediation record shall take effect after
being signed by both parties. Where mediation fails or one party regrets before a mediation record is
served, an arbitral tribunal shall timely render an award”.
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Dispute Cases], supra note 125, art.11. “Where a mediation record made by the labor and personnel
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action”.
222
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Zhengyi Tiaojie Zhongcai Fa (中华人民共和国劳动争议
调解仲裁法) [Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China], supra
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litigation.”223 Under this article, the trade unions are not representatives of employees
involved in the mediation, labor or employment arbitration and employment
arbitration, or litigation. A tri-party labor mechanism is responsible for resolving
labor disputes, and is made up of employee representatives from the All China
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), government representatives from the Ministry
of Labor and Social Security, and employer representatives from the China Enterprise
Confederation (CEC/CED).224 Although the tri-party labor model, adopted in the
Article 8, 225 mimics the tripartite system of the ILO, the unions and employees’
organizations are affiliated with the Party and the government, which might result in
little debate or conflict during the discussions. However, the mandate of the threeparty mechanism does not include employment and social security in the negotiation,
and both the trade union and employer business organizations are limited to making
suggestions without the rights of codetermination in labor standards, procedures, and
norms.226
In order to guarantee the justice and equity of the arbitration, the judicial
review system of arbitration awards as well as the authoritativeness of arbitration
awards deserve special attention. Article 47 addresses the final binding arbitration of
labor disputes. Article 47 states:
“An arbitral award on any of the following labor disputes shall be
final and take effect at the date of rendering of the award except as
otherwise provided for by this Law: 1) a dispute over the recovery of
labor remunerations, medical expenses for a work-related injury,
Id. art.7. “Where a labor dispute involves more than ten employees and the employees have a same
claim, they may recommend their representatives to participate in the mediation, arbitration, or
litigation”.
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Qiao & Appelbaum, supra note 114, at 4.
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调解仲裁法) [Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China], supra
note 217, art.8. “In conjunction with the trade unions and enterprise representatives, the labor
administrative authority of the people's government at or above the county level shall establish a triparty labor mechanism for coordinating the labor relations, and jointly study and address major issues
related to labor dispute”.
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economic indemnity, or compensation, in an amount not exceeding the
12-month local monthly minimum wage level; and 2) a dispute over
the working hours, breaks and vacations, social insurance, etc., arising
from the execution of state labor standards.”227
Interpreting subparagraph 1 of Article 47 of the Labor Dispute Mediation and
Arbitration Law, Article 13 of Interpretation (III) of the Supreme People’s Court of
Several Issues on the Application of Law in the Trial of Labor Dispute Cases states
that “if the arbitration involves several arbitral awards listed in Article 47 (1) with the
determined amount of each of them not exceeding 12 months' local minimum
monthly wage, it shall be held as a final binding award.”228 However, Article 48 of
the Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law states: “An employee who
disagrees to an arbitral award as provided for in Article 47 of this Law may bring an
action in the people's court within 15 days after receiving an arbitral award.”229 That
is to say, the final arbitration does not apply with respect to employees, but applies to
the employers.
As for the employer, if he or she proves the arbitration award prescribed in
Article 47 falls under one of the categories in Article 49, the employer “may apply for
revocation of the arbitral award to the intermediate people's court at the place of
227
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residence of the labor dispute arbitration commission within 30 days after receiving
the arbitral award.” The categories include: “1) an arbitral award is wrong in the
application of a law or administrative regulation; 2) the labor dispute arbitration
commission has no jurisdiction; 3) the legal procedure is violated; 4) the evidence
used to render the arbitral award is forged; 5) the other party has concealed evidence
that is enough to affect the rendering of a fair award; and 6) an arbitrator in arbitrating
the case asks for or accepts bribes, practices favoritism for personal gain or renders an
award by perverting law.”230
In addition, Article 18 of the Interpretation (III) of the Supreme People’s
Court of Several Issues on the Application of Law in the Trial of Labor Dispute Cases
states:
“An employee applies to the people's court for enforcing a final award
of the labor and personnel dispute arbitration committee, while his
employer applies for revocation of the final award to the intermediate
people's court at the place where the labor and personnel dispute
arbitration committee is located, the court shall make a ruling to
suspend the enforcement. If the employer withdraws its application for
revocation of the final award or its application is dismissed, the court
shall make a ruling to resume enforcement. If the arbitral award is
revoked, the court shall make a ruling to terminate enforcement. If the
employer makes a non-enforcement defense in the enforcement
procedure on the same grounds after its application to the court for
revocation of the arbitral award is dismissed, the people's court shall
not support such a defense.”231
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If an employer applies for revocation of an arbitral award to the intermediate
people's court under Article 49 of the Mediation and Arbitration Law, according to
Article 16 of the Interpretation (III) of the Supreme People’s Court of Several Issues
on the Application of Law in the Trial of Labor Dispute Cases, “the ruling of the
intermediate people's court on dismissing the application or revoking the arbitral
award shall be final.”232 Moreover, the judicial review system of arbitral awards is
regulated by the Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues about
the Application of Laws for the Trial of Labor Dispute Cases. For example, Article 21,
it states:
“If any party against the arbitral awards having the evidence which
proves that the labor dispute arbitration award or mediation paper is
under any of the following circumstances, and which is found to be
true upon examination and verification, the people's court can decide
not to implement the said award or mediation paper according to
Article 217 of the Civil Litigation Law: 1) the matters do not fall into
the labor dispute arbitration scope, or the labor dispute arbitration
commission has no authority to decide the matters; 2) there is an error
in the application of law; 3) the arbitrator commits an act of
malpractice for personal benefits and perverts the law in the arbitration
of the case; or 4) the people's court determines that the implementation
of the labor dispute arbitration award would contradict social and
public interests. The people's court shall, in the written ruling of not
implementing the award, notify the parties involved of their right to
bring a lawsuit within 30 days as of the day after the writing ruling has
been received.”233
Id. art.16. “Where an employer applies for revocation of an arbitral award to the intermediate
people's court according to Article 49 of the Mediation and Arbitration Law, the ruling of the
intermediate people's court on dismissing the application or revoking the arbitral award shall be final”.
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party against whom an application is filed produces the evidence which proves that the labor dispute
arbitration award or mediation paper is under any of the following circumstances, and which is found
to be true upon examination and verification, the people's court can decide not to implement the said
award or mediation paper according to Article 217 of the Civil Litigation Law: 1) the matters decided
exceed the labor dispute arbitration scope, or the labor dispute arbitration commission has no authority
to decide the said matters; 2) there is an error in the application of law; 3) the arbitrator commits an act
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Besides Article 48 of the Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law,
which illustrates the employees’ right to file a lawsuit in court, of further help in
figuring out the under what conditions the labor dispute arbitration award could be
litigated in court is Article 17 of the Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on
Several Issues about the Application of Laws for the Trial of Labor Dispute Cases,234
which states “if either party involved is not satisfied with part of the award and lodges
a lawsuit with the people's court after the labor dispute arbitration commission renders
an arbitration award, the labor dispute arbitration award will take no legal effect.”235
Regarding partial litigation of arbitration awards, Article 18 states “after the
labor dispute arbitration commission renders an arbitration award to a labor dispute
involving several workers, if some workers are not satisfied with the arbitration award
and lodge a lawsuit with the people's court, the labor dispute arbitration award will
take no legal effect on the workers that have brought the lawsuit; and take legal effect
on the workers that have not brought the lawsuit; if these workers apply for
implementation, the people's court shall accept their application.”236 If an arbitral
award provided by the labor and personnel dispute arbitration committee contains
both matters on which a final award is issued and matters with no final determinations,
Article 14 of the Interpretation (III) of the Supreme People’s Court of Several Issues
Several Issues about the Application of Laws for the Trial of Labor Dispute Cases] (promulgated by
the Sup. People’s Ct., Dec.16, 2008, effective Dec.31, 2008), art.21 (Lawinfochina) (China).
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Cases], Id., art.17.
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on the Application of Law in the Trial of Labor Dispute Cases states “a party may
bring an action in the people's court against such arbitral awards.”237
If an employee brings an action in the basic people's court according to Article
48 of the Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law at the same time that his
employer applies for revocation of an arbitral award to the intermediate people's court
at the place where the labor and personnel dispute arbitration committee is located
according to Article 49 of the Mediation and Arbitration Law, according to Article 15,
“the intermediate people's court shall not accept such an application; or if it has
accepted it, shall make a ruling to dismiss the application.” 238 If the people's court
dismisses the lawsuit or the employee withdraws the lawsuit, however, “the employer
may, within thirty days after receiving the court ruling, apply to the intermediate
people's court at the place where the labor and personnel dispute arbitration
committee is located for revocation of the arbitral award.”239
The party involved in a labor dispute can directly brings a lawsuit under
Article 12 of the Interpretation (III) of the Supreme People’s Court of Several Issues
on the Application of Law in the Trial of Labor Dispute Cases, if the arbitration
committee fails to make a decision on acceptance of a case or render an arbitral award
within the prescribed time limit. However, there are additional limitations; the party
237
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involved cannot directly bring a lawsuit to the court when “any of the following
situations apply to the pending arbitration: 1) the case is transferred to another
arbitration committee having jurisdiction; 2) the service is being made or there is any
delay in service of process; 3) the committee is waiting for the result of another
lawsuit or a disability appraisal conclusion; 4) the party concerned is waiting for a
hearing by the labor and personnel dispute arbitration committee; 5) the
authentication procedure is started or another department is authorized to investigate
and take evidence; or 6) there is any other legitimate cause.”240
Unlike the arbitration in China, arbitrations in the United States are classified
into labor arbitrations and employment arbitrations. A labor arbitration is the
arbitration of a dispute between an employer and the union representatives of
employees. There are two types of labor disputes in the arbitrations: grievance
disputes and interest disputes. Grievance disputes occur in the application of the
meaning or terms already contained in collective bargaining agreements, while
interest dispute arbitrations provide a method for resolving disputes about the terms to
be included in a new collective bargaining agreement. Because public sector
employees have no right to strike, the interest arbitration is most frequently used to
reach a new agreement. If there is already a collective bargaining agreement, it may
include a grievance arbitration clause for the settlement of grievances relating to a

Id. art. 12. “Where the labor and personnel dispute arbitration committee fails to make a decision on
acceptance of a case or render an arbitral award within the prescribed time limit, and the party
concerned directly brings an action, the people's court shall accept such a case, except that there is any
of the following causes of the pending arbitration: 1) the case is transferred to another arbitration
committee having jurisdiction; 2) the service is being made or there is any delay in service of process;
3) the committee is waiting for the result of another lawsuit or a disability appraisal conclusion; 4) the
party concerned is waiting for a hearing by the labor and personnel dispute arbitration committee; 5)
the authentication procedure is started or another department is authorized to investigate and take
evidence; or 6) there is any other legitimate cause. Where a party concerned brings an action on the
ground that the labor and personnel dispute arbitration committee fails to render an arbitral award
within the prescribed time limit, the party shall submit the acceptance notice issued by the labor and
personnel dispute arbitration committee or any other certificate or proof on the committee's acceptance
of the party's arbitration application”.
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violation of the agreement in front of a neutral third party. In the United States,
because grievance dispute arbitrations make up the majority of labor arbitrations as
opposed to interest dispute arbitrations, unless otherwise stated, the discussion of
labor arbitration in this chapter concerns grievance arbitrations.
The following precedents guaranteed the authoritativeness of grievance
arbitration and the court’s function with respect to the arbitral awards. First, in
Lincoln Mills,241 the court held that even if under section 301(a)242 of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 states that parties involved in the breach of an
agreement may bring suit it any district court of the United States having jurisdiction
over the parties, congressional policy favors the enforcement of agreements through
grievance arbitration.243 Courts’ judicial review function in ensuring the awards from
grievance dispute arbitrations was discussed in the following cases. American
Manufacturing244 emphasized that the function of the court is very limited when the
parties have agreed to submit to the arbitrator related interpretations of all questions in
the contract.245 The courts have no authority to weigh the merits of a grievance when
the parties agree to submit all grievances to arbitration.246 Therefore, when the
interpretation and application of an existing collective bargaining agreement is at
issue, arbitration should be ordered, otherwise, the judiciary usurps a function that has
been assigned to the arbitration tribunal.247 Steelworkers’ Trilogy248 held that the court
has no final say on the merits of the awards arbitrated under the collective bargaining
241
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agreements.249 The courts have no business overruling the arbitral award, which is
legitimate so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. 250
The court, on the other hand, has no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award if
the arbitrator's words demonstrate a failure to meet this obligation.251 According to
Court in Warrior and Gulf, 252 Congress, under section 185(a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA),253 entrusted to the courts’ duty of determining
whether a reluctant party has breached his promise to arbitrate. The judicial inquiry
conducted by the court under section 185(a) of the LMRA must be strictly limited to
the question of whether the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate the grievance or did
agree to give the arbitrator power to make the award.254 The Court also held that the
question of arbitrability is for the courts to decide when there are differences
regarding the interpretation and application of a collective bargaining contract's
provision for arbitration.255
The arbitration hearing may be an informal conference instead of a judicial
trial. Harvey Aluminum Inc.256 indicates that because the rules of evidence applied in
court proceedings do not apply in arbitration hearings, all relevant evidence may be
freely admitted so long as the hearing is fairly conducted. That is to say, the parties
may offer evidence as they desire and such additional evidence will be provided,
while the arbitrator may deem necessary to aid in the understanding and
determination of the dispute.257 An unfair arbitration hearing will be considered in
violation of 9 U.S.C.S.§ 10(c), if the arbitrator refuses to hear and consider pertinent
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and material evidence.258 Moreover, obvious errors in the facts or interpretation of the
law is not a cause for reversing the arbitral award if there has not been a refusal to
hear pertinent and material evidence and the hearing has been fair.259
The Supreme Court in Gardner-Denver260 held that the arbitration’s resolution
of the contractual rights under the collective bargaining agreement, which did not
expressly cover statutory claims and limited the arbitrator's authority to resolve
contractual rights under the agreement, did not preclude a party’s rights under Title
VII to bring a claim into court.261 Also, according to Misco, Inc.,262 as to the
enforcement of an arbitral award under a collective bargaining agreement, a court
may not enforce it if it would be contrary to public policy.263 The public policy should
be explicitly well defined and significant, and is to be ascertained by the laws and
legal precedents, and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.264
Public policy based only on general considerations of supposed public interests, thus,
cannot make a court set aside an arbitration award.265
Moving beyond labor arbitrations, due to the decline of unionization, fewer
employees are covered by the strong grievance procedures under collective
bargaining agreements. To remedy the reduced access to justice in the workplace,266 a
new model of arbitration known as employment arbitration emerged. In this model, it
is much easier for employers to be repeat players in multiple arbitration cases, which
results in a lower win-rate for employees and lower damage awards compared to
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outcomes obtained from labor arbitration or litigation.267 Especially in the case where
an employee is self-represented, the win-rate is lower than if the employee is
represented by the counsel, not to mention the damage award from such a case.268 To
some degree, compared to employment arbitration initiated by an individual employee,
labor arbitration should be the main arbitration method to ensure win-rates and
outcomes. Thus, Chinese legislators would benefit from reconsidering how to set up
and develop a collective labor arbitration system in the first place to relieve increasing
labor conflicts.

B. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND POSSIBLE RESOULTION OF THE
CHALLENGES FACING CURRENT LABOR ARBITRATION IN THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA USING THE UNITED STATES ARBITRATION MODELS
With the increase in labor disputes in China a number of challenges have
arisen. Unions do not play an important role, but instead act as assistants in the
arbitration process. Workers act mostly as individual persons taking part in
arbitrations even if they have collective labor disputes with the employer. There are
major problems with China’s arbitration process.
First, individual workers and representatives of workers bring a labor dispute
to the arbitration committee instead of a union representing employees. In particular,
with respect to collective labor disputes, even if the Labor Contract Law authorizes
the trade union’s legal status in the performance of arbitration, there is insufficient
supportive regulations or policies enacted in favor of the trade unions’ representation
of workers. According to Article 56 of the Labor Contract Law and Article 49 of the
Provisions on Collective Contracts, if a dispute occurring during the performance of a
267

Alexander J. S. Colvin, Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes,
8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 11-4 (2011).
268
Id. at 16-7.

62

collective contract is not resolved after negotiations, the labor union may apply for
arbitration or lodge a lawsuit in pursuance of the law.269 Regarding disputes arising in
the course of a collective negotiation, either party shall not apply for arbitration, but
rather may file a written application to the administrative department of labor and
social security for mediation.
Generally, collective labor disputes in China are also classified into labor
disputes in the performance of collective contract (grievance disputes) and labor
disputes arising in the course of collective negotiation (interest disputes). Contrary to
the United States, interest labor disputes in China cannot be brought before the labor
arbitration committee. Unions, acting mostly as an assistant even in grievance
arbitration, help employees protect their rights by requiring employers that infringe on
workers’ labor rights and interest to bear the ability in the collective contract.270
Given the increase of collective labor disputes in China, the question is how to
guarantee workers’ arbitral rights in collective labor disputes and are unions acting as
representatives for employees in labor disputes arbitration more efficient than
individual workers applying for arbitration.
As for the first question, compared to the United States, interest labor disputes
cannot be arbitrated because China’s legislators and government believe that the
administrative department of labor can resolve this kind of labor disputes more
efficiently. If any party disagrees with the resolution of the administrative department
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of labor, however, the next step of commencing an administrative suit against the
administrative department of labor is even harder for both employees and
employers.271 Relying on the administrative power to solve interest disputes, therefore,
does not improve the efficiency of the process. It is also hard to say whether allowing
interest disputes to be arbitrated is more efficient for the long term relief of labor
disputes arising in the course of collective negotiation because those interests in
future collective contracts are more likely based on negotiations or concessions under
the pressure of economic weapons.
Compared to China, grievance arbitration is the large majority of labor
disputes in the United States; interest arbitration is mainly used in the public sector
because public employees have no right to strikes.272 Once collective bargaining
negotiations have reached an impasse, employers or unions can use economic
weapons, like strikes or a lockout, to put on the pressure. With respect to public
employees, therefore, interest arbitration could be an efficient way to resolve labor
disputes in reaching a new collective agreement. Thus, at least for now, it is useful to
satisfy workers’ demands in the course of contracting because employees can hardly
put pressure on employers by using economic weapons. Although workers’ arbitral
rights are guaranteed by law, because grievance arbitration is a necessary step in
grievance disputes, this kind of mandatory arbitration also induces other problems,
such as increasing the burden on labor arbitration committees, which will be
discussed in the next paragraph. As for the second question, unions acting as
representatives for employees in labor disputes arbitration is more efficient than

Xudong Huang (黄旭东), Meiguo Laodong Zhengyi Zhongcai Tizhi Jiqi Qishi (美国劳动争议仲裁
体制及其启示) [The American Labor arbitration and its implication], Vol.1 Renda Faxue Pinglun (人
大法学评论) [RENDA LAW REW.] 212, 224-25 (2013).
272
David Broderdorf, Mandatory Interest Arbitration in the Private Sector, 26 GPSOLO 38, 38 (2009).
271

64

selecting representatives of those workers who are involved in the same labor dispute
because union representatives have more experience and practice skills in this field.

Second, the arbitration of all grievance labor disputes is gathered to the
particular jurisdictional labor arbitration committee, which means arbitration is a
required before litigation in court. Under such conditions, more labor disputes have
piled up in arbitration committees in several places, and end up exceeding the time
limit of labor arbitration. The most common disputes at issue are usually rights
disputes where workers are asking for basic rights to maintain their living, such as
wages and compensation for breaking the contract. If workers cannot obtain their
wages or compensation as soon as possible, it will significantly threaten the well
being of their families.

In order to ensure the efficiency of arbitration, there is an opinion help by a
majority of scholars in China – arbitration or litigation. “Arbitration or litigation”
means any party in a labor dispute can select whether to use arbitration or litigation as
the method to resolve their dispute, and once the party chooses the arbitration, the
award will be the final binding arbitral award, and vice versa.273 This opinion seems
capable of solving the problem, but there are still some challenges with respect to the
nature of arbitration and equality of justice. According to the records, the rate of
bringing a lawsuit into court after the arbitral award has increased over the years. By
2010, the rate of litigation was up to 58.38%,274 which indicates that the arbitral
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awards in most cases did not satisfy workers’ demands. Under arbitration or litigation,
if any party chooses arbitration as the final binding award, it prevents them from
lodging a lawsuit.

Similar to grievance arbitration in the United States, a great number of
collective bargaining agreements specifically indicate that the decision of an arbitrator
shall be final and binding.275 Vacating the arbitral award by the courts is very limited.
The court will not litigate the merits of an arbitral award, even if there are errors of
facts and law in the arbitral award they are not regarded as sufficient reasons for
dismissing the award.276 The court can vacate the arbitral award if the arbitrators
exceed their authority or the arbitral award is contrary to ascertained public policy by
reference to the laws and legal precedents.277 This “final binding arbitral award”
mechanism presupposed the function of unions, the freedom of choosing arbitration,
and believing in arbitrators’ professional competence. As for current China, with
respect to increasingly severe labor conflicts and the imbalance of power between
labor and management, the “arbitration or litigation” model cannot be adopted
without first reconsidering the defects in the mechanism of labor arbitration.

Further, if any party selects arbitration as the final binding arbitration,
outcome awards obtained from the arbitration are less than the outcome awards from
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the court.278 Given that the awards in labor disputes are mostly for wages and
compensation, a final arbitration that dose not satisfy workers’ basic demands related
to living would negatively affect their families and even result in instability in society.
Although applying the “arbitration or litigation” model might relieve the burden of
the arbitration committee by distributing some labor disputes directed into the courts,
it could not radically resolve the heavy burden of the arbitration committee.

On the one hand, employees may still choose arbitration since it does not
charge either party in labor disputes.279 On the other hand, employees and employers
can only choose to arbitrate or litigate; they cannot select where to arbitrate because
arbitration is authorized by jurisdiction according to Article 21 of the Labor Dispute
Mediation and Arbitration Law.280 Even if workers or employers can select litigation
instead of arbitration, regions with labor-intensive industries will still create much
more labor disputes in arbitration than other places without the free right to select
where to arbitrate among the nearest arbitration committees. It is more efficient for
any party in a labor disputes to select the arbitration location by choice instead of
being assigned one according to the authorized jurisdiction of the arbiter. Like in the
United States where the American Arbitration Association keeps lists of qualified

Xiaojuan Ren (任小娟), Laodong Zhengyi Anjian Shangsulü Jugao Buxia De Yuanyin Fenxin (劳动
争议案件上诉率居高不下的原因分析) [An Analysis of Increasing Litigation Rate of Labor Disputes],
Xian Zhongjishi Zhongji Fayuan (西安市中级人民法院) [Xian Interm. People’s Ct.], (July 9, 2014),
http://xazy.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2014/07/id/1595094.shtml.
279
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Zhengyi Tiaojie Zhongcai Fa (中华人民共和国劳动争议
调解仲裁法) [Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China], supra
note 217, art.53. “No fees shall be charged for the labor dispute arbitration. The funds of a labor
dispute arbitration commission shall be secured by the finance authority”.
280
Id. art.21. “A labor dispute arbitration commission shall be responsible for the labor disputes
occurring within its jurisdiction…a labor dispute arbitration commission at the place of performance of
a labor contract or at the place of residence of an employer shall have jurisdiction of a labor dispute.
Where the two parties respectively apply to the labor dispute arbitration commissions at the place of
performance of a labor contract and at the place of residence of an employer for arbitration, the labor
dispute arbitration commission at the place of performance of a labor contract shall have jurisdiction”.
278

67

arbitrators by location,281 if there is a grievance arbitration clause in collective
bargaining agreement, labor disputes over the implementation and interpretation of
collective bargaining contracts have to be brought to the arbitrators selected by both
parties in the agreement. Additionally, the efficient way for ensuring workers’ right to
organize in the previous chapter can also relieve the burden of arbitration because
workers could fully perform collective negotiation before the arbitration.

Third, regarding judicial review, the main goal of ensuring the
authoritativeness of grievance arbitration is the limited judicial review of the arbitral
awards and arbitrators’ professional qualities. In China, the authoritativeness of
grievance arbitration is set under the law, as the final binding award in two kinds of
conditions282 and as the compulsory arbitration. Despite the two types of final binding
awards listed in the law, employees can still lodge a lawsuit to the court if they do not
satisfy with these final binging awards. The authoritativeness of grievance arbitration,
therefore, is ambiguous: on the one hand, it is ensured by Article 47 of the Labor
Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law, on the other hand, it allows employees to
litigate in court.
Moreover, any party involved in a labor dispute cannot choose the arbitrators
in the arbitration committee, which are instead assigned by their jurisdiction, and
which might be the reason for the high rate of further litigation. In fact, the win-rate
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of arbitration is actually over 80% of all cases,283 but the outcomes of arbitral awards
are lower than those in litigation resulting in a high rate of litigation. Such a high rate
of litigation results from arbitrators’ chronic decision to compromise and meet
halfway on workers’ demands and the arbitrators’ nonprofessional practice. It is true
that selecting arbitrators through negotiation by the union and employer may also
cause the problems. If a party clearly knows about an arbitrator’s attitude towards
similar labor disputes, such party can get more benefits from the arbitration than from
negotiation.284 The solution to this problem is that some states in the United States
offer “final-offer arbitration”. The “final-offer arbitration” averts the tendency to
make concessions halfway between employer and the employee demands, and makes
the arbitrator selects the position of either the employer or the union.285 Thus, such
action, can balance the imperfect information between labor and management, and
can encourage the process of collective negotiation.
In order to ensure the authoritativeness of grievance arbitration, China’s
legislators should consider enacting laws and policies authorizing labor and
management to choose their own arbitrators whom they trust instead of just limiting
any party’s rights of litigation, which also relies on at least the condition of a
development of due process of negotiation between the union and employer. As for
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arbitrators, in some areas, some of them are nonprofessional and are not experienced
in the process of arbitration even if Article 20286 of the Labor Dispute Mediation and
Arbitration Law enumerates the requirements for selecting arbitrators.287
Judicial review in China is significant in order to ensure equality of justice in
arbitration. In Article 49 of the Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law, an
arbitral award may be examined by the court where the employer has evidence to
prove the arbitral award violates the laws provided in such article, which involve both
matters of legal procedure and matters of substantive law.288 After the arbitral award
has taken legal effect, any party against the award can provide evidence to the court to
make a decision on the non-implementation of the award under Article 21.289 These
two rules indicate that the court’s function is not only examining the matter of
substantive law but also examining the matter of legal procedures, which is different
from the limited judicial review in the United States. In order to guarantee the
286
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authoritativeness of grievance arbitration, the court’s judicial inquiry does not include
examining matters of substantive law in the United States. Given the limited judicial
review of arbitral awards, the success and fairness of an award depend on the
professional arbitrators and the flexible procedure arbitration mechanism. For
example, rules of evidence in arbitration are more flexible than in court proceedings.
As long as the hearing is fairly conducted, all relevant evidence may be freely
admitted and rules of judicial procedure need not be ascertained.290 Any party may
offer evidence as they desire and shall provide additional evidence where the
arbitrator may believe that it is necessary to understand and determine the dispute.291
As for China, Article 6, 38, and 39 of the Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration
Law provide for the right to cross-examination and debate in the process of arbitration
and the responsibility of the party adducing evidence to back up its claims.292 The
process of arbitration lacks flexibility as much as the process of the trial court system,
especially with respect to getting the evidence.293 If Chinese legislators allow for a
more flexible process of getting evidence, the efficiency of arbitration will be
improved and the high rate of litigation might be decreased. And also in order to
balance the efficiency of arbitration and equality of justice, limiting the court’s
authority on matters of substantive law could increase efficiency at the cost of
290
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Id.
292
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Zhengyi Tiaojie Zhongcai Fa (中华人民共和国劳动争议
调解仲裁法) [Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China], supra
note 217, art.6, 38, 39. “Where a labor dispute arises, a party shall be responsible for adducing
evidence to back up its claims…where the evidence related to the disputed matter is controlled by an
employer, the employer shall provide it; and the employer who fails to provide the evidence shall bear
the adverse consequences…the parties shall have the right to cross-examination and debate in the
process of arbitration. At the end of cross-examination or debate, the chief arbitrator or sole arbitrator
shall hear the final statements of both parties…the arbitral tribunal shall invoke evidence that is
adduced by the parties and has been found to be true as the basis for determining facts…where an
employee cannot adduce any evidence that is related to an arbitral claim but controlled by an employer,
an arbitral tribunal may require the employer to provide it within a specified period of time. An
employer that fails to provide it within the specified period of time shall bear the adverse
consequences”.
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Xudong Huang (黄旭东), supra note 271, at 225.
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equality of justice if there are defects in the current arbitration mechanism and
nonprofessional arbitrators in practice. Therefore, these challenges should be
reviewed and improved thoughtfully and systematically.

V. CONCLUSION
The comparative analysis of labor laws and arbitrations mechanisms in the
United States and the People’s Republic of China shows that the government should
promote collective bargaining mechanisms, regulate industrial relations, and support
the basic rights of workers in order to promote efficiency, equity, and industrial peace.
With respect to industrial peace, legislators should focus on reforming labor
laws related to collective negotiations and arbitration. Redefining the meaning of
employees is the first important step to guarantee workers the right to join and
organize union activities. As for now, China’s definition of employee is indirect and
is only determined through explaining the meaning of employers and labor relations.
Due to the unclear definition of employee, labor conflicts between labor and
management result from workers who are not protected under the definition of
employee. Broader coverage of employees is critical to protect workers’ fundamental
rights in union activities. The organizing rights of employees is the second step for
ensuring workers the rights to join, organize, and assist union activities. In order to
strengthen workers’ organizing rights, the Chinese government would better
incentivize workers’ motivation by setting up bottom-up trade unions instead of topdown trade unions. As for unfair labor practices during the process of organizing, the
Chinese government should clearly point out and classify unfair labor practices
through codification in the labor laws. Remedies for the unfair labor practices of
employers are additional protections for workers and restrict employers during
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negotiations. Although the Trade Union Law provides certain remedies for nonoffending workers, like “a correction order”, they are not enough for employees for
several reasons. The “correction order” issued by the administrative department of
labor excessively relies on the power of the administrative department of labor and it
is hard for workers to obtain one through the process of “letters and calls
(shangfang)”. Additional remedies, therefore, should be added, such as giving access
to the plant for union to present their views to put pressure on non-complying
employers, and guaranteeing unions’ participation in the “letters and calls” process.
Also, issuing a bargain order without the authorization cards when egregious conduct
is occurring is a significant remedy for workers who are facing especially horrible
treatment.
Once negotiations fail, from an efficiency perspective, alternative dispute
resolutions should protect workers’ rights and relieve labor conflicts. Arbitrations, as
one method of alternative dispute resolution, are compulsory in China for both labor
and employment disputes. In China’s arbitration system, three main challenges arise:
union representatives rarely bring the labor dispute to the arbitration committee
resulting in lower efficiency; compulsory arbitration is the mandatory first step after
internal mediation between labor and management creating waste of judicial
resources and lower efficiency; and guaranteeing the authoritativeness of arbitral
awards without undermining equity. As for the first challenge, “interest arbitration”
should be included in the process of labor arbitration instead of bringing it to the
administrative department of labor to increase efficiency in the process of interest
disputes. In addition, the union representing employees in the labor disputes
arbitration is more efficient than no union participation. With respect to the second
challenge, some scholars advocate the “arbitration or litigation” model, however,
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given China’s increasing labor strife and imbalance of power between labor and
management, this model cannot be adopted without a reform of labor arbitration.
Moreover, in order to solve the problem of inefficiency in compulsory arbitration,
self-selecting arbitrators might be the best method of relieving the burden of the
arbitration committee. As for the last problem, the authoritativeness of arbitral awards
should depend on the supporting labor laws and policies, as well as whether the union
and employer can select their own choose arbitrators. And in order to balance the
efficiency of arbitration and equity under judicial review, although some scholars
argue for limiting the court’s authority on matters of substantive law to increase
efficiency, this limitation harms equity because of the defects in the arbitration system
and nonprofessional arbitrators in practice. The Chinese government, therefore,
should pay more attentions to the challenges above when reconsidering labor laws
and policies.
In conclusion, rebuilding the collective negotiation mechanism through laws
and policies is the best method to pursue industrial peace, efficiency, and equity.
Lacking a collective bargaining (collective negotiation) system, workers have no
choice but to resort to strikes and labor protests to ask for fair treatment. Unsolved
labor disputes must then move on to the next step – the arbitration committee. With
the increase in labor disputes, the arbitration committee’s ability to handle such a
large number of disputes is undermined, lowering efficiency. Due to the changing
global economy and shrinking shares of the labor market for China, the Chinese
government must begin to reconsider how to set up a collective bargaining system
with the attendance of employee organizations, and redefine the terminology in
collective contracts in order to pursue industrial peace and satisfy workers’ demands.
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10. Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Jiuye Cujin Fa (中华人民共和国就业促进
法) [Employment Promotion Law of the People’s Republic of China (revised)]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007,
effective Jan. 1, 2008) (Lawinfochina) (China).
11. Xinfang Tiaoli (信访条例) [Regulation on Complaint Letters and Visits],
(promulgated by the ST. COUNCIL, Jan. 10, 2005, effective May 1, 2005)
(Lawinfochina) (China).
12. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169).
13. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No.80-101, 61 Stat. 136
(1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197).
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